The family as provider of welfare

The role of gender and the family in welfare opinions, preferences, actions and outcomes

Tavernier, Wouter De

DOI (link to publication from Publisher):
10.5278/vbn.phd.socsci.00054

Publication date:
2016

Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

THE FAMILY AS PROVIDER OF WELFARE

THE ROLE OF GENDER AND THE FAMILY IN WELFARE
OPINIONS, PREFERENCES, ACTIONS AND OUTCOMES

BY
WOUTER DE TAVERNIER

DISSERTATION SUBMITTED 2016

AALBORG UNIVERSITY
DENMARK

THE FAMILY AS PROVIDER OF WELFARE

THE ROLE OF GENDER AND THE FAMILY IN WELFARE OPINIONS, PREFERENCES, ACTIONS AND OUTCOMES

by

Wouter De Tavernier

AALBORG UNIVERSITY
DENMARK

Dissertation submitted

.

Dissertation submitted:	September 16, 2016
PhD supervisor:	Professor Per H. Jensen, Aalborg University
Assistant PhD supervisor:	Associate Professor Henrik Lolle, Aalborg University
PhD committee:	Professor Jørgen Goul Andersen (chairman), Aalborg University
	Professor Birgit Pfau-Effinger, University of Hamburg
	Senior researcher Torben Fridberg, SFI
PhD Series:	Faculty of Social Sciences, Aalborg University

ISSN (online): 2246-1256
ISBN (online): 978-87-7112-802-4

Published by:
Aalborg University Press
Skjernvej 4A, 2nd floor
DK – 9220 Aalborg Ø
Phone: +45 99407140
aauf@forlag.aau.dk
forlag.aau.dk

Printed in Denmark by Rosendahls, 2016

Standard pages: 69 pages (2,400 characters incl. spaces).

From the homicidal bitchin'
that goes down in every kitchen
to determine who will serve and who will eat

LEONARD COHEN

DEMOCRACY

CV

Wouter De Tavernier studied sociology (Ba, Ma) and social policy analysis (IMPALLA, MSc) at the University of Leuven. He has conducted research on the Belgian pension system at the Centre for Sociological Research at the University of Leuven for a year, before starting as a PhD fellow at the Centre for Comparative Welfare Studies, Aalborg University. His research interests include social policies related to population ageing and female labour market participation. He is also involved in several research networks, including two COST Actions on ageism and social exclusion in old age.

An overview of his publications can be found here: personprofil.aau.dk/129835.

ENGLISH SUMMARY

In this dissertation, I aim to answer the following research question: *How are opinions, preferences and actions related to women's conditions and their roles in social policy throughout the life course?* The focus is on the role of gender and the family in social policy throughout life. Based on different stages in the process of agency in institutionalist theory, I divide the research question into opinions, preferences, actions and outcomes – each the topic of one article – and link them to cultural ideas and policies.

Despite European societies moving away from the male breadwinner model at different paces, the results of this dissertation show that the family is still an important player in welfare provision for the old on the continent. Women contribute to the welfare of their elder parents through informal care, even at the expense of their own well-being in certain contexts. Interestingly, cultural norms regarding the role of the family in eldercare do not affect women providing informal caregiving, but they do determine the amount of care they give and the impact intensive caregiving has on their own well-being. In countries where familialist eldercare norms are dominant, women are more likely to provide intensive care, yet experience higher well-being in doing so. In countries where eldercare is not seen as a family responsibility, the opposite is true: caregivers tend to give care to a limited extent, and high-intensity caregiving is related to lower well-being. Not only do cultural norms shape the role of the family in welfare supply for the old, familialist policies do so as well. In a study on the Belgian pension system, built on the male breadwinner model, policies can exacerbate the financial dependence of women on their husbands after retirement. This happens by denying married women the receipt of their own pension entitlements, and women face a high risk of poverty in old age after divorce.

I also assess the role of culture and policies in shaping individuals' opinions towards state involvement in care and their retirement preferences. Individuals' actions are rooted in their ideas and preferences, which in turn are formed based on cultural norms and policies in society. Studies on childcare opinions and retirement preferences show that the role of policies and culture goes well beyond setting incentive structures, as they shape the individual's ideas and preferences through internalisation processes. Hence, we can conclude that the family as a provider of well-being is deeply engrained in both culture and policies, and this affects how individuals think about, act upon and experience welfare supply through the family.

DANSK RESUME

I denne afhandling besvares følgende spørgsmål: *Hvordan er opfattelser, præferencer, og handlinger relateret til kvinders betingelser og deres roller i velfærd igennem livsforløbet?* Fokusset er på rollen af køn og familien i velfærd igennem livet. Med udgangspunkt i forskellige stadier i *agency* processen i institutionalistisk teori opdeles spørgsmålet i opfattelser, præferencer, handlinger og udfald – hvert emne behandles i hver sin artikel – og forbindes med kulturelle idéer og politikker.

Selvom de europæiske samfund bevæger sig væk fra den maskuline forsørgermodel i forskellige hastigheder, viser resultaterne i denne afhandling at familien fortsat spiller en vigtig rolle for de ældres velfærdsydelse på kontinentet. Kvinder bidrager til forældrenes velfærd ved at være omsorgsgivere, selvom dette kan skade deres egne velbefindende i visse kontekster. Resultaterne viser at kulturelle normer vedrørende familiens rolle i ældrepleje ingen effekt har på andelen af kvinder, der giver uformel ældreomsorg. Normer vedrørende familiens rolle påvirker dog omsorgens intensitet og effekten af det at give omsorg på individets velbefindende. I lande med stærkt familieorienterede omsorgsværdier er kvinder mere tilbøjelige til at give intensiv omsorg, men de oplever alligevel et højere velbefindende. I lande hvor ældrepleje ikke ses som værende et familieansvar gælder det modsatte: Omfanget af omsorg er begrænset og en højere grad af omsorg er relateret til lavere velbefindende. Det er ikke kun kulturelle normer, der påvirker familiens rolle i velfærden, der ydes til de ældre, familieorienterede politikker gør det også. En undersøgelse af det belgiske pensionssystem, som er bygget på den maskuline forsørgermodel, viser at politikker kan forstærke kvindernes finansielle afhængighed af deres ægtefælle efter tilbagetrækning. Dette skyldes at gifte kvinder nægtes individuelle pensionsrettigheder og at risikoen for fattigdom er høj ved skilsmisse.

Jeg undersøger også kulturens og politikkers betydning i måden hvorpå de påvirker individers opfattelser af hvilken rolle staten bør spille i pleje og i individernes tilbagetrækningspræferencer. Individers handlinger er forankret i deres idéer og præferencer, som er baseret på kulturelle normer og politikker i samfundet. Undersøgelser af holdninger til børnepleje og tilbagetrækningspræferencer viser, at betydningen af politikker og kultur går videre end til blot at forme incitamentsstrukturer: de former individers idéer og præferencer igennem internaliseringsprocesser. Derfor kan vi kan konkludere, at familiens tilvejebringelse af velfærd stadig er forankret i både kultur og politikker, og at kultur og politikker påvirker måderne hvorpå individer tænker om, handler på, og oplever, velfærd, der ydes af familien.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation would not have been possible without the generous support I received before and during the process. First and foremost, I am indebted to Per H. Jensen, who has been the perfect supervisor for me: giving me quite a lot of freedom to pursue my own thing, yet being available when needed and always critical. He also taught me what it means to be Danish, exposing me to *smørrebrød* and *remoulade* on my first day in Denmark and giving me the true Danish Christmas experience. He repeatedly pointed out to me that I am actually a closeted rational choice theorist – it is good to be aware of one's flaws. I am also grateful to my co-supervisor, Henrik Lolle. Not only did he give me help and feedback regarding methodological issues, he also single-handedly supplied me of half of my teaching hours. Fulfilling the teaching requirements is not easy for a non-Dane in our department, and without his support I most certainly would not have succeeded. I would also like to thank my co-authors, Ave and Hans, for the smooth collaboration, Kristian for correcting my Danish summary ('correcting' is an understatement…), and the secretaries, Berit, Birthe, Merete and Mette, for helping me with a wide variety of administrational and practical issues over the years, and for always saying 'yes' whenever I needed something.

Without Wim van Oorschot, I would not have made it here. I am thankful to him for pointing out the existence of a place called 'Aalborg' on the map, and that there was a person named Per Jensen who might be interested in someone like me as a PhD student. Concerned with my integration, he also gave me a Dutch-Danish textbook, so when I arrived in Denmark I could already ask '*Kan jeg slå mit telt op?*' – a very Dutch textbook indeed. However, it is mainly the colleagues at the department who contributed to my integration and who helped me through the occasional mid-week blues with some sweet medicine for the soul and a chat on Wednesday afternoons. I especially thank my fellow PhD students over the last three years in this regard, who made me feel welcome and kept me entertained with some well-timed gatherings around a beer or a barbeque.

My family has been surprisingly supportive of my international adventure, even to the extent that it is suspicious. It is always great to come home and it is nice to know there is a place where I'm always welcome for a retreat. This international adventure was only made possible thanks to one person. First, she 'incepted' me with the idea of pursuing a PhD, subsequently she convinced me of doing so abroad, and now we are living together in two (three?) different countries. For her unyielding support over the last six years, for being on my side when the skies turned grey, for patiently listening to my rants about whatever research-related issues I came up with, I have to thank my best friend and partner in this journey (and hopefully my future wife – will you?): thank you for being there for me, Piret.

Writing a PhD is a long-term endeavour in which one goes through several highs and lows. By far the most difficult moment came half-way through the process, when in barely two weeks' time two of my mentors left this world. First my previous supervisor, Jos Berghman, passed away, entirely unexpectedly. I cannot imagine what my life would have looked like if it was not for his convincing charm, eye for opportunities and belief in my abilities. He sparked my interest in social policy, convinced me to follow the IMPALLA programme giving me the necessary background to conduct welfare state research (and a partner), and offered me a research position afterwards. Much less unexpected, my grandfather also passed away barely two weeks later. He taught me to work hard yet enjoy life, to have an outspoken opinion yet to respect that of others. When at my grandparents', no meal passed without an engaged debate, and even though we barely agreed on anything, it taught me that understanding the point of view of the other is the first step to solving any problem. I dedicate this work to both of them.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLES AND FIGURES

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Welfare states emerged in the golden age of industrial production in the 1950s and 1960s, where workers were paid family wages sufficient to maintain an entire nuclear family on one income. While men were involved in paid work, women typically stayed at home to care for the children or dependent elders. Hence, the male bread-winner model was the cornerstone of society on which the welfare state was built. Therefore, welfare states were typically oriented towards the main risk in such a society: the loss of income for the breadwinner. To deal with these 'old' social risks, social security schemes were developed, protecting the breadwinner against loss of income due to unemployment, old age or disability (Taylor-Gooby, 2004).

Since the heydays of welfare state development, society has undergone some major changes. One of these changes has been the transformation of ideas about the role of women in family and society (Esping-Andersen, 2009). In Western societies, women's roles have moved from an inward or 'centripetal' orientation where the woman's focus was on the family, in the direction of a more outward or 'centrifugal' orientation towards the labour market (Jensen, 1996, p. 53). The increased labour market participation of women challenged the welfare state and generated new social risks regarding child- and eldercare, as well as a new need for work-family reconciliation policies (Bonoli, 2007; Taylor-Gooby, 2004). Moreover, the fundamental assumption on which welfare states were built, a stable nuclear family in which a married couple would stay together 'till death do us part', became untenable (Bonoli, 2007; Pierson, 2001a). Increasing divorce rates and the emergence of new family forms challenged the focus of protecting the breadwinner income, especially in Bismarckian welfare states where social security guaranteed an income to the worker rather than to the citizen. Hence, the transition of the family creates pressures for welfare state expansion to cover new social risks, and for welfare state adaption to readjust social policies to new family forms.

In this dissertation, I further explore the relationship between gender and the welfare state answering the following research question: *How are opinions, preferences and actions related to women's conditions and their roles in social policy throughout the life course?* The dissertation comprises four articles, each focusing on different areas of social policy and different elements of the research question (opinions, preferences, actions and conditions or outcomes). The four articles of this dissertation are related to different stages in the life course. The research is thus linked to the role of the family in provision of welfare at different stages in life: childcare and (early) motherhood; eldercare and 'late daughterhood'; the retirement transition; and poverty and income security after retirement. The goal of this introduction is to supply an overarching theoretical framework within which the four articles can be situated, discussing the central theories and concepts in greater depth, and to present the

methods used more thoroughly than is possible in one article. In this introduction, I briefly present the four articles and subsequently motivate my choice to discuss institutionalism and the concept of defamilisation in the theoretical framework.

The first article, *Do self-interest, ideology and national context influence opinions on government support for childcare for working parents? A multilevel analysis*,[1] deals with opinions of people regarding whether the state should be responsible for childcare for working parents, and as such is closely related the question of mothers' employment. Using 2008 European Social Survey (ESS) data, it assesses to what extent five different hypotheses used in the literature on welfare opinions more generally can explain whether individuals favour government support for childcare services for working parents. Individuals' ideologies, including both gender and welfare ideologies ('ideology hypothesis'), and self-interest ('self-interest hypothesis') are rather bad predictors of these opinions, particularly the latter. Even though the country-level accounts for only one tenth of total variance, the hypotheses related to the aggregate level perform much better. Certain aspects of childcare policies ('institutional effect hypothesis'), in particular the average amount of childcare hours available per week, appear to affect opinions, supporting the institutional effects hypothesis. Also public interest ('public interest hypothesis') contributes to explaining opinions regarding government support for childcare, with these opinions being related to the female employment rate and the prevalence of part-time work. Finally, there are some important cultural effects of religious affiliation and the shared idea of welfare provision being a government responsibility in society ('culture hypothesis').

The second article, *When do people want to retire? The preferred retirement age gap between Eastern and Western Europe explained*,[2] co-authored with Ave Roots, aims to explain retirement preferences in Europe. The article deals with ageing and extending working lives, focusing on the gender gap in retirement preferences. For the analysis, we employ European Social Survey (ESS) data again, this time from 2010. At the individual level, retirement preferences are linked to job demand and job control, typical predictors of issues such as stress and health problems. Also retirement policies affect individuals' retirement preferences, in particular the legal retirement age. Differences between male and female legal retirement ages

[1] De Tavernier, W. (2015). Do self-interest, ideology and national context influence opinions on government support for childcare for working parents? A multilevel analysis. In I. Salagean, C. Lomos & A. Hartung (Eds.), *The young and the elderly at risk: Individual outcomes and contemporary policy challenges in European societies* (pp. 181-204). Mortsel: Intersentia.

[2] De Tavernier, W., & Roots, A. (2015). When do people want to retire? The preferred retirement age gap between Eastern and Western Europe explained. *Studies of Transition States and Societies*, *7*(3), 7-20.

substantially account for differences in retirement preferences between men and women.

After a paper on opinions and one on preferences, the third article, *Culture matters: Employment, informal eldercare and caregiver burden in Europe*,[3] deals with women's actions and their outcomes. Based on data from women in their 50s and 60s from the Survey on Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), I show how cultural norms about family responsibilities in eldercare are related to women's decisions to give informal care for dependent elders. The paper also goes a step further and links these norms to outcomes of providing care in terms of well-being. The paper yields some interesting results. First, no relation is found between the employment of women and their involvement in informal care. Second, the share of women in the population supplying informal care is surprisingly stable over all countries in the dataset, though there are large differences in the amount of time spent caring on average in these countries. And third, cultural norms appear to be an important moderator of the relationship between caregiving and well-being: the informal caregiver burden seems to affect countries where family care is not the norm, while well-being is actually higher among informal carers in countries where family care is the norm.

The fourth article, co-authored with Hans Peeters, *Lifecourses, pensions and poverty among elderly women in Belgium: Interactions between family history, work history and pension regulations*,[4] focuses on outcomes and takes a more historical perspective. It illustrates with data from Belgian administrative registers how path dependent policies are not being adapted to women's changing life courses leading to problematic outcomes – *in casu* poverty after retirement. Price and Ginn (2006) for instance note that women have lower pensions because of their lower participation rates in the labour market resulting from their care responsibilities at home and gender discrimination in wage setting, factors taken into account in pension calculation. However, in the paper we illustrate that whether this leads to precariousness after retirement very much depends on the pension regulations in place: the Belgian pension system is very protective against 'old' risks such as widowhood, but fails to offer social protection in case of 'newer' social risks such as divorce.

The goal of the theoretical framework in this introduction is to explain how the different elements in the research question (opinions, preferences, actions,

[3] De Tavernier, W. Culture matters: Employment, informal eldercare and caregiver burden in Europe. Article submitted.

[4] Peeters, H., & De Tavernier, W. (2015). Lifecourses, pensions and poverty among elderly women in Belgium: Interactions between family history, work history and pension regulations. *Ageing and Society*, *35*(6), 1171-1199.

outcomes), which are each discussed in a separate article, are related. As such, the introduction theoretically ties the articles together and places them within one broader theoretical framework. In the theoretical framework I discuss in more depth what constitutes opinions, preferences and actions of individuals, and how they are related to macro-level aspects such as norms and policies. The section also illuminates issues not explained in the articles, among others why policies tend to be stable over time even when societies change, and how emerging incongruences can impact both society and policy. New institutionalism offers a theoretical framework connecting all the dots, linking these different elements. The different institutionalisms each highlight different aspects of this relation between individual actions and structural factors such as policies and culture: rational choice institutionalism links policies and preferences with actions; sociological institutionalism connects norms and actions through internalisation of those norms; and historical institutionalism deals with the remaking of institutions through individual action. The research question also refers to women's roles and social policy throughout the life course. Indeed, welfare states have played an important role in the institutionalisation of the life course, determining who to be and what to do depending on one's chronological age (Kohli, 2007). Through this process, social policies and welfare cultures not only steer individuals' life courses, but also connect events earlier in life to new outcomes. Whereas the articles each focus on a specific period in life, I discuss in the theoretical framework how these are linked over the life course through institutionalisation of the life course, thus exploring the relation between the life course perspective and institutionalist theory. Hence, in the first part of the theoretical framework (Section 2.1), I discuss 'new institutionalism' in depth, explain how it ties the concepts of opinions, preferences and actions together and links them to norms and policies, and integrates the life course and institutionalist perspectives.

The research question focuses on the effects of social policy on women's conditions, preferences and actions. The concept of 'defamilisation' is a core concept in feminist social policy literature, initially launched as a critique of Esping-Andersen's (1990) male-centred concept of decommodification, entirely overlooking the family as a provider of welfare and the role of women therein. As the provision of care within the family still largely remains the responsibility of women, the extent to which the state takes over the provision of care from the family has an important impact on women's lives and increases their choices of what to do. Hence, defamilisation is the main concept related to the analysis of the role of gender and the family in social policy. All four articles deal with such issues of the role of gender and the family in social policy, and even though the concepts of familialism and defamilisation are explicitly referred to in two of the articles, none of the articles contain a critical discussion of the concept. Therefore, I provide a critical discussion of defamilisation in the second part of the theoretical framework (Section 2.2), showing that there is much debate and little agreement about what the concept exactly entails. Furthermore, by reflecting on the concept of defamilisation in light of the life course, I come to the conclusion that defamilisation could be a useful concept when studying

specific policies, though it might not be suitable for the analysis of networks of dependence throughout life.

After the theoretical framework, where both institutionalism and defamilisation are discussed, I elaborate on the research methods used in the articles comprising this dissertation. The articles are all based on quantitative data, and make use of multilevel linear regression and logistic regression. As there is little room to discuss research methods at length in the articles, they are presented in more detail here, introducing the methods and why they are used, and discussing benefits and pitfalls. Finally, in the conclusions, the findings of the articles are related back to the theoretical framework presented here.

CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The four articles deal with each of the elements of the research question – opinions, preferences, actions and conditions (or outcomes) – separately, and link them to social policies and/or cultural norms. However, several theoretical issues remain unexplored in the articles, as two take a very empirical approach (the articles on childcare opinions and poverty after retirement) and the theoretical framework is relatively limited in the other two, for instance regarding the relation between norms, roles or identities, and well-being in the article on informal eldercare. At the same time, all articles take an institutionalist approach, either by explicitly referring to the different institutionalisms with their respective logics (e.g., rational choice institutionalism and the logic of calculation, or sociological institutionalism and the logic of appropriateness), or implicitly by illustrating a situation that exemplifies an institutionalist logic (e.g., the inertia in Belgian pension legislation as a textbook case of the logic of path dependence in historical institutionalism, see Section 2.1.4). Moreover, the theoretical framework presented here also aims to transcend and integrate the stories of the four otherwise rather self-contained articles that make up this dissertation, tying together the core concepts of each article. Indeed, institutionalism offers a theoretical framework that allows for the incorporation of the four articles. The three different institutionalisms (rational choice, sociological and historical institutionalism) each focus on specific aspects of the relation between opinions, preferences, actions, conditions, norms and policies. In rational choice institutionalist thinking, individuals are rational actors seeking to execute their preferences; sociological institutionalism explains the origins of those preferences as the result of internalisation of societal norms in individuals' identities; and historical institutionalism incorporates the temporal aspect by focusing on the reproduction (and occasional change) of norms and policies over time. In sum, institutionalism can not only explain how opinions, preferences, actions and outcomes are constituted and related to norms and policies, but also how they are interrelated.

After presenting and reflecting on the different strands in institutionalist theory (Sections 2.1.1-2.1.4), institutionalism is linked to the life course (Section 2.1.5). The life course perspective links events taking place at different stages in life, linking things happening earlier to decisions and/or outcomes later in life. As such, it links childcare and eldercare issues to retirement decisions and outcomes in terms of pension income. This interdependence of life events and conditions over time is the result of the legal and normative institutionalisation of the life course. Perverse situations can – and do – occur when life course institutions change over time, for instance when legal life course institutions today have not adapted to the evolutions in normative life course institutions.

In the second part of the theoretical framework (Section 2.2), I discuss the concept of defamilisation. The concept has its roots in the feminist critique of the absence of the role of gender and the family in Esping-Andersen's (1990) analysis of welfare regimes, and is now a central concept in the analysis of the role of gender and the family in welfare states. As such, I also refer explicitly to the concept in two articles (those on childcare opinions and informal eldercare), and even though it is not explicitly mentioned in the other two (the articles on retirement preferences and poverty after retirement), they both touch upon issues that could easily be analysed from a defamilisation perspective. However, at no point do I scrutinise the concept of defamilisation in the articles, despite there being some fundamental disagreements in the literature on what the concept exactly entails. Therefore, the section presents differences in understandings of the concept, and aims to go beyond those disagreements and present a specific conceptualisation of defamilisation.

2.1. NEW INSTITUTIONALISM

Following March and Olsen's (1984) critique on political theory, 'new institutionalist' thinking has become the main paradigm in political science and policy studies. Whereas interests (actors' preferences), power (distribution of resources) and 'constitutions' ('the constraints imposed by the rules of the game' (March & Olsen, 1984, p. 739)) were considered as exogenous factors in political theory of the era, the authors argue that all three are at least partially endogenous to the political process. These critiques are incorporated in different strands of new institutionalism. Hall and Taylor (1996) distinguish three strands in new institutionalist thinking: rational choice, sociological and historical institutionalism. However, together with several other authors, they argue that there are only two different approaches to how institutions matter for individual behaviour in institutionalism: the economic 'calculus approach' and the sociological 'cultural approach' (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Knill & Lenschow, 2001; Mahoney, 2000; Searing, 1991). In the calculus approach, individuals are strategic actors acting rationally to maximise their utility; in the cultural approach, individuals interpret the world and act based on norms, ideas and world views. These two approaches coincide with the basic principles of rational choice and sociological institutionalism, respectively.

Historical institutionalists, in explaining how exactly 'history matters' for current institutions, rely on either one or a combination of both approaches. As such, much like life course research,[5] historical institutionalism is a perspective more than a theory on how institutions develop and interact with individuals. In fact, one could even argue that the time dimension inherent to the dialectical process of the institution and action constituting one another means that sociological institutionalism is

[5] Radl (2014) indeed notes that the life course idea is concerned with the same logic of 'path dependence' that also forms the basis of historical institutionalism.

historical by its very nature: institutions are seen as prior to individual action, which in turn confirms and recreates institutions (Bell, 2011; Buhari-Gulmez, 2010; Finnemore, 1996; Scott, 2008; Zafirovski, 2004; Zucker, 1977).

Some authors (e.g., Ginosar, 2014; Mackay, Kenny & Chappell, 2010) add a fourth, more recent type of institutionalism: constructivist (Hay, 2006; 2004) or discursive institutionalism (Schmidt, 2010), which focuses on the role of ideas and how they spread. However, as none of the articles in this thesis deal with discourses, I will not go into this issue. In this section, I first discuss the different types of institutionalism with a focus on opinions, preferences, actions and outcomes; then I will integrate the different institutionalisms and combine them into a life course perspective.

2.1.1. RATIONAL CHOICE, PREFERENCES AND PREFERENCE THEORY

Hall and Taylor's (1996) '*calculus approach*' is at the core of rational choice theory. Individuals have a fixed set of preferences, rationally choose how to act and do so strategically and instrumentally to fulfil those preferences as much as possible – that is, to *maximise* their *utility*. As such, action requires 'extensive calculation' (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 945). *Labour supply theory* is the application of rational choice theory on the decision to enter the labour market. A person enters the labour market if the value of working – that is, the wage – is higher than the value of not working (Blau, Ferber & Winkler, 2010, p. 89). Utility is derived from the consumption of goods and services, which requires both non-working time and an income from work. Therefore, the individual choses what he or she considers the 'optimal' combination of income from work (and thus working time) on the one hand, and non-working time and consumption on the other. As such, the individual is assumed to prefer more income and less working time.

In the rational choice institutionalist view, institutions are formal rules agreed to by rational actors to reduce the uncertainty of how others will act, and of the consequences of their own actions (Hall & Taylor, 1996; North, 1990; Peters, 2012). The major advantage of rational choice institutionalism is that it has a very clear explanation for why institutions affect individuals: individuals follow institutions in response to rewards or punishments attached. As individuals are assumed to have fixed preferences – a preference for time and money in labour supply theory (Cloïn, Keuzenkamp & Plantenga, 2011; Hakim, 2000) –, they respond to institutions in a rational way, either by using them to their benefit or by trying to change or remove them if they think they limit their utility maximisation (Ginosar, 2014; Peters, 2012; Zafirovski, 2004).

Rational choice theory has received many critiques. Several authors have pointed out that the assumption of fixed preferences is problematic. Rational choice theory

cannot explain where preferences come from, and if they are indeed fixed,[6] then institutional change can only occur if circumstances change – meaning that both preferences and institutional change are exogenous to the model (Bell, 2011; Clemens & Cook, 1999; Edeling, 1998; Hakim, 2000; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Peters, 2012). Also the assumption of rational and self-centred individuals has been critiqued for limiting individual agency to rational utility maximisation and overlooking alternative reasons for individuals' actions. Pfau-Effinger and Rostgaard (2011b), for instance, argue that the assumption of self-centred and egoistic actors is incompatible with the moral roots of care work and cannot explain the gendered division of labour therein.

Hakim (2000) aims to find a compromise between rational choice theory and some of these critiques. She criticises the standard assumption in labour supply theory that women prefer family life over paid labour: 'Economists' usual assumption is that all women give priority to family activities and responsibilities, simply because it is only the female that gives birth' (p. 4). Instead, she proposes a different theory, '*preference theory*', arguing that women have heterogeneous preferences regarding paid work and the family, and that their labour market behaviour largely corresponds to these preferences. Women, Hakim (2000) argues, can broadly be categorised into three groups based on their preferences: home-centred women with a preference for staying at home and focusing on the family; work-centred women who focus on their careers; and adaptive women who seek to strike a balance between both, leading to interrupted and unplanned careers and enrolment in part-time work.

Despite the effort to reconcile rational choice theory with the normative framework of sociology, pointing out that preferences are embedded in 'local social and cultural institutions' (p. 168) and that they 'do not predict outcomes with complete certainty' (p. 169), Hakim's (2000) preference theory does not escape these same criticisms. Particularly, her optimism about the decreasing structural and cultural constraints on women's choices, and the idea that women 'can choose to reproduce or transform social structures' (Hakim, 2000, p. 170) has been the subject of harsh criticism. Several authors have argued that Hakim underestimates the role of cultural constraints, from the role norms play in shaping preferences to the constraints they place on the choices women make about commitment to work and family life (James, 2009; Johnstone & Lee, 2016; Lewis, 2006; Närvi, 2012; Pfau-Effinger, 2012), and that women's options remain very constrained due to structural and institutional issues such as the lack of childcare or suitable jobs (Crompton & Lyonette, 2005;

[6] As rational choice institutionalists take preferences as a 'given', they do not occupy themselves with the question of where preferences come from. While disregarding the origins of preferences *de facto* indeed means the assumption of fixed preferences, rational choice theory does not necessarily involve the theoretical assumption of fixed preferences (e.g., Pollak, 2002, p. 5).

2006; Debacker, 2008; James, 2009; Kangas & Rostgaard, 2007; Kumra, 2010; Lewis, 2006; McDowell, Ray, Perrons, Fagon & Ward, 2005; McRae, 2003; Närvi, 2012; Radl, 2014; Stähli, Le Goff, Levy & Widmer, 2009; Steiber & Haas, 2009; Tomlinson, 2006). In the words of McRae (2003, p. 333): 'Hakim appears to confuse voluntary action with genuine or unconstrained choice'.

After criticising economists for assuming preferences are stable, Hakim (2000) makes the same assumption when stating that women remain faithful to their preference groups. This assumption has also been the subject of criticism in many studies, arguing that women cannot be categorised into three distinct groups (Hagelskamp, Hughes, Yoshikawa & Chaudry, 2011; James, 2009; McDowell et al., 2005; McRae, 2003), that there is little consistency in group membership over time (Campbell & van Wanrooy, 2013; Johnstone & Lee, 2016), and that preferences not only determine women's employment choices, but that women also adapt their preferences to the employment situation they find themselves in (Kan, 2007; Kanji & Cahusac, 2015; Schober & Scott, 2012; Steiber & Haas, 2012). Furthermore, Hakim (2000) claims that, while family-centred and work-centred women have stable preferences over time, adaptive women would be more responsive to policies as their preferences are more dependent on changes in opportunities or constraints. This claim generates a duality in the understanding of the concept of 'preferences'. With the term 'preferences', she refers both to more 'fundamental' preferences that are stable over time, such as being oriented towards the family or towards the labour market, and to preferences for concrete actions, such as staying at home, working part-time etc. Indeed, there is no reason for adaptive women's fundamental preferences (combining both a qualitative working and family life) to change depending on the policies a government passes. But their preferences for concrete actions will be affected by changes in opportunity structures that facilitate this combination or make certain options more attractive.

Finally, both labour supply and preference theory assume a far-going individualisation, where the individual makes decisions by him or herself. However, the reality is more complicated, with partners negotiating the division of labour within the household (Duncan, Edwards, Reynolds & Alldred, 2003; Duncan & Irwin, 2004; Krüger & Levy, 2001; Närvi, 2012). Research shows that, among couples, the partners' attitudes also affect one's involvement in home work and childcare (Cooke, L. P., 2006; Gaunt & Scott, 2014), and that husbands' attitudes affect women's employment decisions (Debacker, 2008; Kangas & Rostgaard, 2007; Kanji, 2011). Furthermore, retirement decisions are made at the household level (Loretto &

Vickerstaff, 2012). The idea of negotiation is entirely absent from these rationalist approaches.[7]

Despite all these critiques, rational choice theories do contribute to a better understanding of women's employment and care choices. It can help us understand why and how individuals respond to policies. Indeed, the major advantage of rational choice institutionalism is that it offers a very clear explanation for why the institutions at the macro-level affect individuals at the micro-level: they follow institutions in response to rewards or punishments attached. Most agree that personal preferences are important for the decisions individuals make, even though the discussion is about the extent to which this decisional latitude is limited by structural and cultural constraints.

The rational choice institutionalist perspective is included in the article on childcare opinions (for a discussion on opinions and rational choice institutionalism, see Section 2.1.3) and informal eldercare. In the former, the assumption is that individuals would support policies from which they (could) benefit; the rational choice perspective in the latter refers to considerations of the division of time between work and informal care that are at the core of labour supply theory. Finally, though not explicitly done so in the article on retirement preferences, the relation between the individual's health and retirement preferences could be analysed from a rational choice perspective. Indeed, the desire to quit paid work may be an understandable rational response to health problems in case working longer may jeopardise health further, or when the health problems negatively affect the individual's productivity and therefore his or her earnings capacity, reducing the gap between (potential) work and non-work income.

2.1.2. SOCIOLOGICAL INSTITUTIONALISM: NORMS AND PREFERENCES

Apart from the 'calculus approach', Hall and Taylor (1996) also identify a '*cultural approach*' that is at the core of sociological institutionalism. In this approach, individuals act upon their ideas and worldviews, as well as on their interpretations of reality. Sociological institutionalism has a very different nature compared to rational choice institutionalism, first and foremost because the concept of 'institution' has a very different meaning (Alasuutari, 2015; Bevir & Rhodes, 2010; Finnemore, 1996; Ginosar, 2014; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Peters, 2012). While rational choice institutionalists reduce institutions to formal regulations, sociological institutionalists

[7] This does not mean that negotiation is not present in rational choice theory in general. In Gerry Becker's New Home Economics, for instance, there is a movement toward the inclusion of a bargaining perspective (Chiappori & Lewbel, 2015, p. 411, see e.g. Becker, 1974).

have a much wider understanding of the concept, referring to collective understandings about how one should act:

> From this perspective, institutions provide moral or cognitive templates for interpretation and action. The individual is seen as an entity deeply embedded in a world of institutions, composed of symbols, scripts and routines, which provide the filters for interpretation, of both the situation and oneself, out of which a course of action is constructed. (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 939)

Institutions in the sociological sense comprise not just formal rules, but also *shared norms* and ideas about what is right or wrong, cognitive scripts and routines, symbols and meanings (Bevir & Rhodes, 2010; Denzau & North, 1994; Finnemore, 1996; Pfau-Effinger, 2005; Pfau-Effinger & Rostgaard, 2011b; Schmidt, 2010; Scott, 2008; Searle, 2005; Zucker, 1977). In other words, sociological institutions define which behaviour is *appropriate* in a certain context (Knill & Lenschow, 2001; Mackay, Monro & Waylen, 2009; March & Olsen, 1989; Olsen, 2009; Schmidt, 2010; Scott, 2008). In this understanding of the concept, institutions and culture are synonymous (Alasuutari, 2015; Grendstad & Selle, 1995; Hall & Taylor, 1996). In contrast to rational choice institutionalism, where institutions are considered exogenous to the individual, these cultural ideas are internalised through *socialisation* processes, shaping individuals' roles, identities and preferences (Edeling, 1998; Finnemore, 1996; Gaunt & Scott, 2014; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Hodgson, 2007; Immergut, 1998; Mackay et al., 2009; Olsen, 2009; Powell & Colyvas, 2012; Ruitenberg, 2016; Schmidt, 2010) – hence, institutions not only constrain individuals, they also constitute or 'mould' them and as such play an enabling role (Clemens & Cook, 1999; Finnemore, 1996; Grendstad & Selle, 1995; Hodgson, 2007; Schmidt, 2010; Searle, 2005). Once internalised, individuals act upon their norms and values, their beliefs of what is good and bad or right and wrong (Pfau-Effinger & Rostgaard, 2011b). By doing so, individuals confirm and recreate institutions (Bell, 2011; Buhari-Gulmez, 2010; Finnemore, 1996; Hodgson, 2007; Powell & Colyvas, 2012; Scott, 2008; Zucker, 1977). Hence, institutions and individual action are mutually constitutive. Over time, these norms and practices are formalised by policy-makers seeking legitimacy: by acting in accordance with certain norms, actors and their actions are seen as legitimate by those with whom they share these norms (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Mackay et al., 2009; Miller & Banaszak-Holl, 2005).

Hence, in sociological institutionalism, cultural norms and ideas are internalised through socialisation processes, where they do not just shape individuals' preferences, but the individuals themselves. Some authors refer to this as shaping *identities* (Gaunt & Scott, 2014; Hagelskamp et al., 2011; Kanji & Cahusac, 2015),

others as dispositions[8] (James, 2009; Vincent, 2016) or *mental models* (Denzau & North, 1994). As a result of the internalised nature of sociological institutions, they function in a rather different way than institutions as perceived by rational choice institutionalists. Whereas in the latter case, the individual has to be aware of the existence of the institution to consider the costs and benefits of acting upon it as compared to those of alternative courses of action, sociological institutions 'influence behaviour not simply by specifying what one should do but also by specifying what one can imagine oneself doing in a given context' (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 948). Indeed, taboos or 'unthinkable actions' are a fundamental part of identities (Fershtman, Gneezy & Hoffman, 2011).

The fact that individuals act upon their mental models does not mean that sociological institutionalism denies rationality, as certain critics suggest (Mackay et al., 2010; e.g., Hakim, 2000). While some merely suggest that rationality is limited by certain boundaries (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Pfau-Effinger, 2005; Scherger, 2009), others have argued that decisions about such fundamental issues such as work or care are made with a different kind of rationality: an 'internal conversation' (Archer, 2004) in which individuals '"weigh" one role against another' and 'evaluate their social concerns against their other commitments' (Archer, 2004, p. 293), or a '*moral rationality*' (Duncan et al., 2003; Duncan & Irwin, 2004), in which individuals 'take such decisions with reference to moral and socially negotiated (not individual) views about what behaviour is right and proper' (Duncan et al., 2003, p. 310). Utility maximising rationality only comes in second place. Through this process of moral rationality, individuals turn their wider norms and ideas about how to act into preferences for concrete action: 'This preference is not readily accommodated (…), but depends rather on moral reasoning about the best way of allocating time and resources in relation to other people's needs' (Duncan & Irwin, 2004, p. 392). This moral rationality plays an important role when the individual experiences conflicting norms in a certain situation. Such a '"lack of fit" (…) enables individuals to perceive previously taken-for-granted conditions, and opens up possibilities for change' (James, 2009, p. 318). Indeed, mismatches between norms are the drivers of institutional change in sociological institutionalism, meaning that change in sociological institutionalism is at least partly endogenous to the model (Finnemore, 1996; Kangas & Vestheim, 2010; Scott, 2008).

The article on retirement preferences includes a section on sociological institutionalism related to the question of how formal rules are internalised into individuals, discussing both this non-economic form of rationality and a certain 'embodiment' of

[8] Interestingly, Hakim (2000) also refers the family-centred, home-centred and adaptive categories as '"packages" of *predispositions*' (p. 189, emphasis added), suggesting that they are indeed of a more fundamental nature and do not change with changing opportunity structures the way the preferences for concrete action of adaptive women do.

formal regulations through the creation of habits. Further, sociological institutionalism is also present in the article on informal eldercare with its strong focus on the role of norms, both in eldercare decisions and outcomes in terms of well-being. Though sociological institutionalism is not explicitly mentioned in the other two articles, both articles illustrate the role of norms in the formation of individuals' opinions (article on childcare opinions) and in women's employment decisions (article on poverty in retirement).

2.1.3. INTERMEDIARY REFLECTIONS ON OPINIONS, ACTIONS AND OUTCOMES[9]

Now that I have explained both rational choice and sociological institutionalist approaches, and distinguished mental models (or 'fundamental preferences') from preferences for concrete action – from now on the term 'preferences' will only refer to the latter[10] –, the question is how *opinions* fit into this scheme. Concepts such as norms, let alone 'internalised norms' have no place in a rational choice institutionalist view, as the individual merely is a rational actor deciding on how to maximise his or her own utility. Therefore, opinions are only relevant from this perspective if they refer to *preferences* for action. Within rational choice theory, such preferences reflect the self-interest of the individual, as it refers to the individual choosing to maximise utility.

In a sociological institutionalist view, opinions can reflect both *mental models* and preferences, though classifying opinions in either category has important consequences for how we can analyse and explain opinions. If we were to perceive them as reflections of mental models, then we can expect broader culture in society to affect opinions, but it would mean that we cannot analyse opinions as a function of other opinions, as they would be at the same level (both reflecting mental models) and therefore they would at best correlate, but could not be causally related to one another – making an explanation of one opinion in terms of the other irrelevant. If, on the other hand, we classify them as preferences, then we can explain them in relation to mental models, meaning that we could relate specific opinions to more fundamental ideas about how the individual sees the world. But if we classify opinions as preferences, then we cannot assume that culture in wider society would have any effect on these opinions: cultural norms and ideas only influence

[9] In the remainder of the text, I will only use the term 'institutions' to refer to formal rules, state structures and policies to avoid confusion. Institutions in the sociological sense will be referred to with terms such as norms, cultural values or beliefs.

[10] This is in line with, for instance, Campbell and van Wanrooy (2013), who note that preferences are the result not only of fundamental ideas about how the world works, but are also affected by the perceived feasibility of certain options. Moreover, for March and Olsen (1989), preferences are 'individual interests'.

preferences through their internalisation, meaning that if mental models are controlled for, higher-level cultural variables should not have any effect. Nonetheless, Likki and Staerkle (2015), for instance, find that individuals' opinions are affected by societal ideas of 'welfare dependency culture', even when controlling for individual ideology.

Regarding actions, the transition from preferences to actions is not a direct one, resulting from conflicting institutions requiring a certain rationality of the individual. Several authors have pointed at 'tensions', 'mismatches' or 'gaps' between institutions and the 'dilemmas' or 'conflicts' they bring about (Clemens & Cook, 1999; Denzau & North, 1994; Edeling, 1998; Finnemore, 1996; Grendstad & Selle, 1995; Olsen, 2009; 2007; Peters, Pierre & King, 2005; Pfau-Effinger & Rostgaard, 2011a; Schmidt, 2010). In a first step, which one could call *consideration*, the individual evaluates possible courses of action based on conflicting preferences. In rational choice institutionalism, these are calculations and strategic decisions aimed at fulfilling preferences; in sociological institutionalism rationality is about considering different available options through a lens of internalised dispositions or mental models (Edeling, 1998; Immergut, 1998; Selznick, 1996; Thelen, 1999). The second step in the transition from preference to action is that of *negotiation*. Negotiations not only take place within the household to determine the division of work (Cooke, L. P., 2006; Debacker, 2008; Duncan et al., 2003; Duncan & Irwin, 2004; Gaunt & Scott, 2014; Kangas & Rostgaard, 2007; Kanji, 2011; Närvi, 2012), but in the case of eldercare, the care has to be negotiated at least between caregiver and care-receiver (Zechner & Valokivi, 2012).

In case of *conflicting internalised norms* (or 'role-identities' (Gaunt & Scott, 2014)), the individual may have difficulties coping with the consequences of his or her decisions. Acting in a way that does not conform with one's mental models can lead to severe strain. Stähli et al. (2009, p. 333) note that 'preferences have little impact on mothers' labour force participation, but explain a good deal of their frustration if the factual situation does not correspond to their wishes'. Kanji and Cahusac (2015), for instance, describe how female professionals face identity problems when quitting their jobs to take care of their children – a situation of strain lasting until these women finally decided to let go of their professional identities to focus on their roles as mothers. Schober and Scott (2012, p. 526) note that about a quarter of 'new' parents change their gender role attitudes after childbirth, especially 'if paid work and care arrangements are at odds with their prenatal gender role attitudes'. Also Steiber and Haas (2012) argue for a reciprocal relationship between attitudes and behaviour. Such outcomes resulting from conflicting institutions are the drivers of institutional change.

2.1.4. HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND SUBOPTIMAL OUTCOMES

According to Schmidt (2010), historical institutionalism has its own logic: just like rational choice institutionalism is built on the 'logic of calculation' and sociological institutionalism is characterised by the 'logic of appropriateness', historical institutionalism would be based on the 'logic of path dependence'. *Path dependence* is the central concept in historical institutionalism: it refers to policies and institutions being very difficult to change or replace once they are put in place (Peters, 2012). However, path dependence is a 'black box'; for its mechanism to be explained beyond the mere statement that 'history matters', one has to rely either on the calculus or the culture approach – or both (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Knill & Lenschow, 2001; Mahoney, 2000; Pfau-Effinger & Rostgaard, 2011b).[11] Knill and Lenschow (2001, p. 189) boldly describe historical institutionalism as 'borrowing somewhat eclectically from the other two schools though with a special appreciation for the influence of history for present-day policy making'. Hence, I would argue that path dependence is a mechanism rather than a logic in itself. What does distinguish historical institutionalism from the others, however, is the central role of *collective actors* such as organisations, whereas rational choice and sociological institutionalism primarily focus on individuals as actors and their relation with policies and norms.

Several authors indeed identify a sociological institutionalist branch in historical institutionalism, dealing with the relation between cultural values in society and formal institutions (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Mahoney, 2000; Thelen, 1999). Denzau and North (1994) and Roland (2004), for instance, argue that cultural norms evolve slowly but constantly (which is an assumption and thus external to the model), while formal institutions have long periods of stability occasionally interrupted by 'punctuated' change. This fast change in formal institutions happens when the gap between the static formal institutions and the incrementally changing norms in society become too big and lead to tensions – so formal institutions are being 'recalibrated' to the changed society. Also Pfau-Effinger (2005; 2011) points out that policy change and cultural change happen at different speeds. In what she calls the 'welfare arrangement' approach, welfare policies are embedded in welfare culture, that is, shared ideas about the welfare state (Pfau-Effinger, 2005; 2012). As long as these ideas are largely coherent and stable in a society, policies are likely to follow the same path. Path departure occurs in societies which are divided on welfare cultures or where values are changing. Pfau-Effinger (2005) gives the example of the

[11] Note that we only discuss path dependence as 'self-reinforcing sequences' and not as 'reactive sequences' in Mahoney's (2000) typology. The latter refers to sequences with a dialectic character, where responses and counter-responses follow each other up, which is not in line with the usual interpretation of the concept of path dependence in historical institutionalism.

Netherlands, where ideas about the family have been changing in the direction of increased orientation of women towards the labour market since the 1960s. Policy change, on the other hand, only started occurring from the 1980s onwards. She contributes this to path dependence: 'the social actors in the process are still behaving under the influence of the structures and models they have challenged' (Pfau-Effinger, 2005, p. 14). Hence, Pfau-Effinger (2005) agrees that social policies are especially prone to change if the existing policies do not match dominant cultural values or the social system in society. However, she contests the idea that cultural change necessarily is a slow-moving process, as Denzau and North (1994) and Roland (2004) claim. Pfau-Effinger (2011) convincingly illustrates this point using data on Spain, where a large group of women are dissatisfied with the availability of professional childcare, despite efforts of the Spanish government to generate childcare places during the 2000s. The fact that institutional change cannot keep up with cultural change indicates that the transition in women's orientations from family-oriented or 'centripetal' to labour market oriented or 'centrifugal' values (Jensen, 1996; Jensen & Møberg, 2011) happens at a rather high pace in Spain. However, one could argue that the time dimension inherent to the dialectical process of institution and action constituting one another means that sociological institutionalism is historical by its very nature: institutions are seen as prior to individual action, which in turn confirms and recreates institutions (Bell, 2011; Buhari-Gulmez, 2010; Finnemore, 1996; Scott, 2008; Zafirovski, 2004; Zucker, 1977).

Following Paul Pierson (2000; 2001b; Peters, 2012), much of the literature on historical institutionalism has tried to explain why path dependence exists and institutions tend to reinforce themselves, which follows a rational choice approach and assumes that actors are rational and pursuing their self-interest – both organisational and individual actors. Organisations have competing preferences and interests, and they do or do not manage to implement those into policy depending on the amount of power they have. This assumption of rationality is very visible in Myles and Pierson's (2001, p. 312) definition of path dependence: 'each step along a path produces consequences which make that path more attractive in the next round and raises the costs of shifting to an alternative path'. This definition follows North's (1990) idea of path dependence as increasing returns, explaining why policies tend to stick to a chosen path as a result of transaction costs, even if more efficient alternatives are available (Pierson, 2000; 2001c; Thelen, 1999; Wood, 2001).

Increasing returns not only lead to '*positive feedback processes*' (Pierson, 2000), power does as well (Mahoney, 2000; March & Olsen, 1989; Thelen, 1999). Much of the literature in fact focuses on how institutions generate power for certain organisations and not for others (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Pierson, 2000). Existing political institutions affect the organisations involved in negotiations on welfare state reform, the power relations between them and the strategies they use to pursue their interests and preferences (Swank, 2001; Wood, 2001). As such, institutions are tools or 'means' organisations have at their disposal to exert power and realise their goals

(Clasen, 2005). Therefore, those who have the upper hand in the power relation will be eager to protect the existing institutions or even strengthen them, so as to secure their powerful position (Pierson, 2000; Thelen, 1999). However, the power delivered by institutions can be counterbalanced by a second source of power for political organisations: public support. Discourses play an important role in acquiring public support (Clasen, 2005; Kitschelt, 2001).

Based on their competing preferences and relative power derived from public support and the institutional framework, organisations negotiate for changes in policies and institutions. Hence policies and institutions are both independent and dependent variables in policy change (Clasen, 2005), leading to a cyclical process. Because of this self-reinforcing cycle, Bevir and Rhodes (2010) critique historical institutionalism for its determinism. However, several historical institutionalist authors have rejected this critique, arguing that path dependence is not a deterministic force, but rather makes certain choices more probable than others – hence it is a matter of probability rather than possibility (Clasen, 2005; Pierson, 2001c; Swank, 2001; Wood, 2001). *Change* is the result of unintended consequences of policies (Hall & Taylor, 1996) or evolutions in the domestic and international context: economic changes such as fluctuations in GDP or unemployment, political changes such as the emergence of new parties or fractions and social changes (Bonoli, 2001; Clasen, 2005; Swank, 2001; Wood, 2001). The critique that change is exogenous to the model in historical institutionalism (Bell, 2011; Kickert & van der Meer, 2011; Thelen, 1999) is rejected by March and Olsen (1989; 2006), arguing that change is the result of contradicting interests struggling for power (March & Olsen, 1989) or 'enduring gaps between institutional ideals and institutional practices' (March & Olsen, 2006, p. 12). As such, the sociological strand of historical institutionalism and its focus on incongruences between cultural norms and formal rules as drivers of institutional change are brought in again.

While the logic of path dependence is good at explaining why welfare retrenchment does not take place, it has greater difficulties making sense of emerging policy fields (Peters, 2012; Peters et al., 2005). Hence, it can explain why pension policies have been very difficult to reform despite the financial pressure generated by pay-as-you-go schemes (Clasen, 2005; Myles & Pierson, 2001), while it cannot explain the emergence of family policies (Clasen, 2005; Ferragina & Seeleib-Kaiser, 2015). As path dependence is better at explaining welfare retrenchment than welfare expansion, Clasen (2005) notes that it is more useful when analysing the development of policies dealing with 'old social risks' than for policies targeting 'new social risks' such as family policy. This gap can be filled by sociological historical institutionalism, as from this point of view the emergence of family policies is the political response to changing ideas in society about the role of the family as provider of welfare, and the conflicts generated by the incongruence of 'old' policies with these 'new' norms. Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser (2015) indeed note that, while family policy emergence was mainly related to advocacy of women's organisations in the 1980s and 1990s, its

expansion since the 2000s is the result of broad public support stemming from a shift in cultural ideas about female employment and the family.

While three of the articles focus on the effects of norms and policy rather than on their formation, the article on poverty in retirement is a textbook example of path dependence. It illustrates how Belgian pension policies have largely remained the same since the 1950s, disregarding the major changes in family consistency and women's roles that took place over the same period. The high poverty risk certain women face is an unintended consequence of this incongruence and may well trigger policy change in the future.

2.1.5. INSTITUTIONS AND THE LIFE COURSE

The life course perspective links events taking place at different moments in life, linking events that happened in the past to decisions and outcomes later on. Through the *institutionalisation of the life course*, especially present in pension policies where earlier labour market participation determines access to and generosity of pension income, childcare and eldercare affect retirement processes and pension incomes. Therefore, the inclusion of the life course perspective contributes to the integration of the separate articles, each taking place at different stages in life. The institutionalisation of the life course is one of the main theoretical insights in the life course literature (Dannefer, 2010; Kohli, 2007; Radl, 2014). The idea essentially is that chronological age has become the basis for formal rules and cultural norms about who to be and what to do. In other words, many institutions, both formal and sociological, are related to age. By setting age requirements, the welfare state is one of the main drivers of institutionalisation of the life course into formal rules – consider the ages of compulsory education and formal retirement ages, delineating three distinct periods in life: education, employment and retirement (Cooke, M., 2006; Kohli, 2007; Möhring, 2016). As Radl (2014) points out, such 'blueprints' for life help individuals make complex decisions, such as when to retire.

Many norms are age-dependent too, and act as 'social time schedules' (Scherger, 2009). Women in their late twenties and early thirties are expected to have children; many workers above age 50 face discrimination as they are considered too old to be employed, to be productive or creative. Several of these norms are also gender-specific, typically related to reproduction and care tasks regarding children and dependent parents. As such, life courses are not only institutionalised, they are also gendered (Moen, 2011; Radl, 2014). Life course norms have especially changed for women, with younger generations of women being more and more expected to be oriented to the labour market (James, 2009). Age-related norms are reinforced by social policies: by giving individuals a certain status, such as 'pensioner' or 'unemployed', the welfare state gives individuals an identity and including norms about how to behave or not to behave (Möhring, 2016). As a pensioner, you can enjoy

your ‘well-earned rest’; as an unemployed person you are expected to actively look for work.

The institutionalisation of life courses not only affects individuals at a certain age, it also bridges and binds periods in life – or, as Möhring puts it, they ‘[involve] a transmission of achievements in one life phase to subsequent phases’. For instance, unstable employment earlier in one’s career can affect one’s retirement possibilities later on in life (Raymo, Warren, Sweeney, Hauser & Ho, 2010). Spanning over longer periods, tensions can emerge between formal life course institutions and norms related to the life course (Krüger & Levy, 2001). Pension entitlements, for instance, are typically related to one’s labour market participation earlier in life. Pension systems are designed based on a male breadwinner model, with good old age income protection for those with stable, full-time careers. Hence, they have difficulties coping with today’s more diverse life courses, especially those of women (Han & Moen, 1999). In other words, the change in formal life course institutions cannot keep up with the change in life course norms. As such, social policies contribute to gendered cumulative advantages and disadvantages over the life course: reducing one’s involvement in paid labour to take care of children not only leads to immediate income loss, it also reduces pension entitlements in old age (Cooke, M., 2006; Harrington Meyer & Parker, 2010; Worts, Sacker, McMunn & McDonough, 2013). Such a cycle of cumulative disadvantages can also be started by ‘disruptive events’ such as an accident or job loss (Pearlin, Schieman, Fazio & Meersman, 2005).

A major point of discussion in life course research is to what extent lives have become more individualised – that is, to what extent they have become de-institutionalised. While Berger et al. (1993) note an increasing de-standardisation of life courses since the 1950s, McMunn et al. (2015, p. 60), for instance, find that ‘[w]omen’s and men’s work-family life courses are becoming increasingly similar’. According to Scherger (2009) and Worts et al. (2013), individualisation has led to a transformation of institutions from involving direct sanctions to containing incentives. Hence, the individual has more decisional latitude over his or her own life course, but is considered responsible for the choices he or she makes and the outcomes of these choices. Moreover, both studies point not only at disembedding tendencies, but also at re-embedding ones, such as the emerging expectation for everyone to be in the labour market. This tendency of individualisation of responsibility, which is also present in social policy, becomes especially problematic when there is a mismatch between political and cultural developments: in Pascall and Lewis’ (2004) view, unpaid care workers will be the victims of these developments. Moreover, Duncan et al. (2003) and Duncan and Irwin (2004) criticise this idea of individualisation as increased individual choice, which has been the basis of social policy reforms, while in reality decisions affecting the life course are not individual but negotiated ones. This idea of life courses being formed through continuous negotiations with others when making decisions is known in the life course literature as ‘linked lives’ (Levy, Gauthier & Widmer, 2006). Loretto and Vickerstaff (2012), for instance, show how

retirement decisions are negotiated at the household level, in which several concerns are discussed including personal health, health of other family members, financial and family situation.

2.1.6. CONCLUSION

Institutionalist theory connects the different elements of the research question, each a subject of one of the articles in this dissertation. Rational choice institutionalism takes preferences, typically time and money, as a given, and subsequently assumes that individuals as rational actors act in a strategic way to fulfil their preferences. Sociological institutionalism sees these preferences as rooted in the 'mental models' or identities of individuals, themselves the result of internalisation of norms in society. By acting in accordance with the norm, the norm itself is confirmed. Hence, opinions can refer either to the more fundamental 'mental models', or to more concrete and action-oriented preferences. Deciding on whether a specific opinion reflects the individual's mental models or one's preferences, has direct consequences for the types of variables that can be taken into account to explain the opinion: if it concerns a concrete preference, then both self-interest and indicators reflecting the individual's mental models can be used as explanatory variables; if the opinion on the contrary is a reflection of the individual's mental models, then it only makes sense to include variables about norms at the societal or aggregate level in the model. In the article on childcare opinions, this distinction is not made, combining cultural, self-interest and ideological indicators at the same time.

The article on retirement preferences investigates, among others, the relation between the formal retirement age and retirement preferences. Both from a rational choice and a sociological institutionalist perspective, one would hypothesise that a lower official or legal retirement age means that individuals will want to retire earlier. However, the logics explaining the same outcome are different: a rational choice institutionalist would expect an individual who is offered a sufficient non-work income to retire from the labour market, as it would supply the individual with both time and income; a sociological institutionalist would argue that individuals internalise the retirement age as an age norm, making it socially accepted or even expected for the individual to retire at a certain age – hence turning a legal boundary into a normative one.

The article on informal eldercare also builds on rational choice and sociological institutionalism, in this case to explain women's choices to give informal care to their dependent parents. Lacking information on the respondents' ideas about work and the family, the article includes a series of variables that could be expected to affect women's informal caregiving decisions from a rational choice perspective (e.g., employment, health condition, physical distance), and some indicators about cultural norms in society (the female labour market participation rate and to what extent eldercare is seen as a family responsibility in the country). In a subsequent step, the article analyses well-being in relation to work-care decisions and their cultural

setting. While rational choice institutionalism does not offer a clear explanation for why work-care decisions would impact well-being differently in diverse cultural settings, sociological institutionalism does: if societal norms are internalised into the person's own identity, then acting against those norms, and thus against the individual's own moral principles, would create strain within the individual.

Historical institutionalism adds a temporal element to policy development, arguing that existing political institutions affect current decision-making in a process of path dependence. Such path dependencies can explain why policy change in many cases lags behind cultural change in society, as illustrated in the article on Belgian pension policy and poverty among retired women. The article shows that married and widowed women, family forms frequently occurring at the time when the Belgian pension system matured in the 1950s, are well-protected after retirement. Divorced women or women who never married, on the contrary, run a high risk of poverty – despite often being more active in the labour market than married or widowed women. This stipulates the importance of the institutionalisation of the life course in pension research: despite increased labour market participation after separation, the damage for their pension build-up is already done due to the cultural norm of quitting the labour market when married or pregnant which was widespread at the time. These higher poverty rates women face in certain family forms, that are now considered normal, could be interpreted as emerging tensions between policies and cultural norms, a driver of policy change within historical institutionalism.

2.2. DEFAMILISATION

Writing about the role of gender and the family in social policy, the concept of defamilisation is hard to negate: much of the debate on the role of women and the family in social protection and care evolves around the concept. Despite being referred to explicitly in two of the four articles in this dissertation, at no point do I critically discuss the concept in the articles. Therefore, I present and discuss different ideas about the concept of defamilisation in the literature, and relate the articles to these discussions in the conclusion of this section.

Since its publication, Esping-Andersen's (1990) *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* has been criticised harshly by feminist scholars for its male-centred approach to social policy (Orloff, 2009). In his analyses, Esping-Andersen (1990) overlooks the fact that, in male breadwinner societies, the concept of 'the individual' only refers to male heads of families (Lewis, 1992). As Knijn and Ostner (2002) and Blome, Keck, and Alber (2009) point out, the concept of decommodification assumes that individuals and their labour are commodified, thereby overlooking women who are not active in the labour market, failing to recognise unpaid labour as a source of production, and negating the responsibility of the welfare state regarding women's emancipation. Lewis (1992) and O'Connor (1993) indeed argue that many women are in fact decommodified: they are not dependent on the market but instead on the

family for the provision of welfare. Moreover, decommodification is not as useful a concept for analysing social services as it is for social security systems. Therefore, feminist scholars launched the term '*defamilisation*', capturing the extent to which the welfare state allows women to be independent of the family.

There are many different conceptions of what defamilisation exactly means, resulting from its inherent complexity: while (de-)commodification refers to the dependence of the individual on the labour market, (de-)familisation involves a network of (inter)dependencies between family members, shaped by cultural norms and existing realities. Defamilisation refers to the extent to which an individual is independent of the family for his or her welfare provision. Studies on the concept differ regarding the kind of dependencies taken into account (financial or care dependencies) and the subjects between whom these dependencies are investigated (dependencies between spouses or between parents and their children). In this section, I present a critical overview of the concept.

2.2.1. ECONOMIC VS. SOCIAL DEFAMILISATION

Defamilialism has been defined by Lister (1997, as quoted in Bambra, 2007, p. 326) as 'the degree to which individual adults can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living, independently of family relationships, either through paid work or through social security provisions'. This definition focuses solely on *financial dependencies* within the family. In the same vein, Bambra (2007, p. 327) subsequently defines defamilisation as 'the extent to which the welfare state enables women to survive as independent workers and decreases the economic importance of the family in women's lives'. Another definition of the concept comes from McLaughlin and Glendinning (1994, as quoted in Kröger, 2011, p. 428), labelling 'those provisions and practices which vary the extent to which well-being is dependent on 'our' relation to the (patriarchal) family' as 'de-familisation'. While this definition agrees with the previous ones that defamilisation is about managing to live independently from family ties, either by maintaining one's standard of living or by reaching a specific level of well-being, the latter is oriented towards *care* rather than economic dependence (Daly, 2011; Kröger, 2011), and does not limit the concept to the relation between husband and wife. This last aspect is also stipulated by Leitner and Lessenich (2007), drawing also the care receiver – usually children and elderly – into the debate. Finally, according to the definition of McLaughlin and Glendinning (1994), defamilisation is about 'the terms and conditions under which individuals engage in family life' (Daly, 2011, p. 6), especially those set by policies.

Kröger (2011) proposes to separate the issues of economic and care dependence on the family, reserving the term 'defamilisation' for the former while designating the latter as 'dedomestication'. However, I would argue that both are different manifestations of what is fundamentally the same process: the responsibility for welfare provision moving away from the family to professional welfare institutions.

Moreover, 'dedomestication' as a concept suggests that care moves out of the setting of the home, negating the transition from institutionalised to professional home care taking place in many Western countries (Blome et al., 2009). Therefore, I will follow Leitner and Lessenich (2007), using the terms 'economic' and 'social' defamilisation to distinguish between financial and care dependencies, respectively. This distinction counters the critique of Saxonberg (2013) that paid leave schemes for care cannot be placed in a defamilisation framework, with his understanding of defamilisation being very unidimensional: paying individuals to take care of family members is socially familial, but economically defamilial (at least on the condition that the benefit is sufficient for the carer to sustain an acceptable standard of living). Even though Leitner and Lessenich (2007) note that, when relieving women from care tasks, they do not necessarily access the labour market – implying that defamilisation of care does not necessarily lead to economic defamilisation –, we could argue that the opposite is true: women's economic independence can only be secured on the condition that the responsibilities concerning care and home-making that are traditionally assigned to them are alleviated (Esping-Andersen, 1999) – paid leave schemes for care being a notable exception to a certain degree (Leitner & Lessenich, 2007). In other words, the policies that are supposed to relieve women (partly) from their care obligations, and those enabling women to participate in the labour market, are fundamentally the same. This interpretation is in line with the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the concept of defamilisation by, for instance, Esping-Andersen (1999), using indicators such as childcare coverage.

Esping-Andersen's (1999) definition of defamilisation allows for the incorporation of both financial and care dependencies. The concept 'capture[s] policies that lessen individuals' reliance on the family; that maximize individuals' command of economic resources independently of familial or conjugal reciprocities' (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p. 45). 'A familialistic welfare regime', on the contrary, he says, 'assigns a maximum of welfare obligations to the household'. While the reference to control over economic resources places the definition in the same stream as Lister (1997), the wider statement about the assignment of welfare obligations to the household can include both dimensions. We should point out, however, that family obligations for welfare provision can reach well beyond the limits of the household: familial eldercare, for instance, does not necessarily require the family carer to live in the same household. Later on, Esping-Andersen (2009, p. 51) indeed refers to familialism as 'individuals' welfare dependence on kinship' rather than on the household.

2.2.2. POLICY VS. CULTURE

The definitions of Lister (1997), McLaughlin and Glendinning (1994) and Esping-Andersen (1999) also differ in another way: Esping-Andersen (1999) considers defamilisation as a characteristic of policies; McLaughlin and Glendinning (1994) take the wider institutional approach when specifying defamilisation as 'provisions

and practices', which can refer to both policies and cultural factors; and Lister (1997) takes the individual as the starting point, with defamilisation referring to individuals having the possibility to have their basic needs fulfilled from sources other than the family. The latter definition does not specify which factors can affect this possibility, create or limit it, and hence can include both effects of policies and cultures.

This brings us to the debate on the use of policy characteristics or policy *outcomes* as measures for defamilisation. Despite conceptualising defamilisation in terms of policies, many studies operationalise the concept in terms of outcomes (e.g., Ciccia & Bleijenbergh, 2014; Esping-Andersen, 1999; Szelewa & Polakowski, 2008; for a good exception, see Javornik, 2014) or welfare spending (e.g., Ciccia & Bleijenbergh, 2014; Hook, 2015; Kleider, 2015). In recent years, authors have increasingly warned us that we should measure policies by their characteristics and not their outcomes, the core argument being that outcomes are 'contaminated': they are not only the result of policies but also of cultural norms and their interactions (e.g., Budig, Misra & Boeckmann, 2012). Ironically, while both Leitner (2003) and Saxonberg (2013) initially warn us about the difference between policies and outcomes, they go on to use outcome measurements such as childcare coverage rates in their own operationalisations of defamilisation, respectively degenderisation.

This confusion over what defamilisation exactly entails may be a root cause for why different studies disagree on how to classify certain countries. Lewis (1992), for instance, brands Ireland and the United Kingdom as 'strong male breadwinner' states; Leitner (2003) classifies them as 'defamilial'; and Ciccia and Verloo (2012) place the countries in the categories of 'unsupported universal breadwinner' and 'male breadwinner', respectively. Lewis' (1992) analysis goes well beyond mere policies and includes both political and cultural aspects. Ciccia and Verloo (2012) only analyse entitlements, and their categorisation of the United Kingdom as 'male breadwinner' and Ireland as 'unsupported universal breadwinner' is not at all visible in a key outcome variable such as the employment rate: according to Eurostat (2015), 56.5 per cent of women aged 15-64 were employed in Ireland and 67.1 per cent in the UK in 2014, as compared to 66.9 and 76.8 per cent of men, respectively.

This *separation between policy and culture* and their effects on outcomes is a fictitious one, a theoretical illusion. It is based on the misconception that we can assess policies as good or bad, disregarding the contexts in which they are implemented. The cultural context within which a certain policy is implemented is not external to the policy; it is a vital component of it. The same policy can be introduced for different reasons in different contexts, and as such can have different outcomes. Hence, analysing the extent to which policies are 'familial' or 'defamilial' without reference to their outcomes or cultural setting is entirely meaningless. Jensen (1996), for instance, illustrates that the principle of equal pay for equal work for men and women was introduced in Denmark and Italy for different reasons. While in Denmark, egalitarian ideas and stimulating female employment were the objectives

of the regulation, the principle was introduced in Italian law with the explicit aim of excluding women from the labour market by making female labour more expensive and thus less attractive for employers. The introduction of the same principle indeed had the desired outcomes in both countries: high female employment in Denmark; women's exclusion from the labour market in Italy. If we were to evaluate gender equality in the Danish and Italian labour markets based on policies, we would mistakenly conclude that both countries are highly gender equal in this regard: the 'real face' of the Italian policy only reveals itself in its objectives and outcomes. By analysing defamilisation solely in terms of the policies themselves and disregarding the contexts in which they are implemented and the outcomes they produce, we might fall into the same trap. A similar argument is found in Ostner (2010), who points out that the context is important to determine whether a policy is really (de-)familialist. She refers for instance to the development of parental leave in Germany, which would be considered explicit familialism at face-value, but in fact aims to strengthen women's ties with the labour market and to shorten the periods of leave they would take after childbirth. Hence, the introduction of what looks like an explicitly familialistic scheme is in fact a step towards reduced familialism. At the same time, the introduction of parental leave schemes in Hungary had the opposite effect and turned women into a 'reserve army of labourers' (Fodor & Kispeter, 2014). Hence, analysing familialism in policies without taking the cultural setting into account is not only meaningless, it might also lead to the wrong conclusions.

Especially regarding care, culture can be a strong moderator for how policies impact outcomes. Pfau-Effinger (2011) illustrates this with a comparison of satisfaction of mothers of young children with their role as mothers. Despite similar employment rates among women with children below three years of age, Finnish mothers of young children are more satisfied with their primary role as a mother than are their Spanish counterparts. The author shows that this is likely related to their different cultural values and ideas about motherhood.

2.2.3. IMPLICIT VS. EXPLICIT FAMILIALISM – AND THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK

The link between cultural norms and policies becomes especially prevalent when discussing implicit and explicit familialism, as these concepts reflect different objectives of policy-makers (and thus their normative frameworks) and effects of policies on society. *Explicit familialism* refers to a situation where governments explicitly place responsibilities with the family; *implicit familialism* occurs when governments do not intervene in a certain field and leave the initiative to private persons or institutions (Javornik 2014; Leitner 2003). A government not supplying or subsidising professional childcare, for instance, is implicitly familialist as it leaves parents with no other option but to resort to family care if they cannot afford market care. Explicit familialism can be linked with conservative ideas about the family and the distribution of tasks within it, while implicit familialism is rather the consequence

of a liberal point of view on private initiative and minimal state intervention – or familialism as austerity. Defamilisation, to the contrary, is traditionally linked with the social-democratic welfare regimes (Blome et al., 2009; Esping-Andersen, 1999).

When combining the distinction between explicit and implicit familialism and defamilialism with the social/economic familialism dichotomy, however, classifying policies as explicit or implicit familialism or defamilialism becomes a rather complex exercise. The social and economic dimensions do not fall into the same category in any of the welfare policies listed in Table 2-1. Moreover, in at least two cases it is not possible to categorise one of the components as explicit or implicit familialism, or defamilialism, without an understanding of the cultural setting within which a policy is introduced. Professional care services take care responsibilities away from the family and are therefore socially defamilialising, but do not necessarily lead to economic defamilisation: for example, childcare services were originally introduced in Spain as an educational measure and not for care relief for the family (Escobedo, 1999). Low social benefits, on the other hand, are considered implicit familialism as they force individuals to be dependent economically on the people around them, but whether low replacement incomes push women into paid work (as economic theory would suggest) or into becoming a homemaker and taking up informal care tasks may well depend on the broader cultural context. From this, we can draw two conclusions: first, that branding policies as a whole as implicitly or explicitly familial or defamilial is not feasible as it would involve a very unidimensional view on policies; and second, policies may have very different outcomes in terms of familialism dependent on the context in which they are implemented.

Table 2-1 Explicit and implicit familialism and defamilialism in the social and economic components of welfare policies

	Social	**Economic**
Paid care leave	Explicit Familial	Defamilial
Unpaid care leave	Explicit Familial	Implicit Familial
Professional care services	Defamilial	?
Low social benefits	?	Implicit Familial
Social benefits with family rate	Implicit Familial	Explicit Familial

2.2.4. BACK TO THE ROOTS: TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF DEFAMILISATION

So far I have concluded that defamilisation refers to the degree to which individuals are independent of the family for welfare provision, which can entail both financial and care dependencies; that 'defamilisation' is a complex and multidimensional concept; and that marking policies as familial or defamilial is only possible with reference to the cultural context and meaningful in light of their outcomes. The aim of this section is to give a more precise answer to the question of what defamilisation exactly entails, and to answer that question I go 'back to the roots'.

In Figure 2-1, I present a figure based on Pestoff's (1992, p. 25) illustration of the 'welfare mix'. The three main suppliers of welfare – state, market and the family – can be distinguished from one another by three division lines: formal (state and market) vs. informal (family); public (state) vs. private (market and family); and for-profit (market) vs. non-profit (state and family).[12] Esping-Andersen's (1990) concept of *decommodification* essentially refers to a transition from for-profit to non-profit welfare supply, as it refers to the extent to which an individual can maintain an acceptable standard of living independent of the market. While Esping-Andersen originally considered the concept in a context of social security, and thus as a transition from market to state supply of income, feminist researchers pointed out that welfare provision can also be decommodified by transferring it from the market to the family. This is the case for many women who are not in paid work nor receive public support, but are instead supported by their husbands' income (Knijn & Ostner, 2002; Lewis, 1992; Orloff, 2009). A second transition, austerity, moves welfare supply from the public to the private sphere, pushing state responsibilities towards families or markets. Following the same logic, then, *defamilisation* is a transition from informal to formal welfare supply, thus, from family to state or market provided welfare.

[12] Normally, the third sector, consisting of non-profit organisations, is also included in the figure and is situated in the gap in the middle (non-profit, private and formal). However, I did not include the third sector in Figure 2-1 as it does not appear in any of the four articles included in this PhD.



Figure 2-1 Defamilisation in context

If we take the insight that defamilisation is a transition from informal to formal welfare supply as the starting point, then this automatically means that the concept refers to outcomes reached in terms of who actually supplies the welfare, and not just to the policies present in a certain country. Such a focus necessarily means taking into account different factors that contribute to the existence of a certain welfare mix, and thus analysing both policies and the cultural context within which they emerge and through which they affect society. Analytically, this implies going back to the initial way of analysing the family's role in social policy as found, for instance, in Lewis' (1992) article: an encompassing case-by-case analysis of policies and cultural factors, and how this mixture leads to specific outcomes. A contemporary illustration can be found in Hook's (2015) study showing that the effect of social policies on female employment is dependent on class, especially in Anglo-Saxon and Mediterranean welfare states, which can be the result of both financial considerations (not being able to afford childcare) and cultural differences between social classes (e.g., high-educated women being more career-oriented).

2.2.5. DEFAMILISATION, DEGENDERISATION OR INDIVIDUALISATION?

Ciccia and Bleijenbergh (2014) argue that the concept of defamilisation cannot distinguish maternity and paternity leave, despite their very different outcomes in terms of gender equality. That critique is entirely correct, and indeed points to the need for an analysis in terms of gender. A major problem of the concept of defamilisation, however, is that it is used to tackle two different issues at the same time: the extent to which the family is relied on for the supply of welfare, and the gendered distribution of labour (within the family and beyond). In line with my conception of defamilisation as outlined above, referring to a transfer of welfare responsibilities away from the family, the concept should not refer to the very related though fundamentally different issues of gender equality and the gendered division of labour. I would propose reserving the concept of defamilisation strictly for the former, and using Saxonberg's (2013) concept of '*degenderisation*' to refer to the latter. Even though both concepts are strongly intertwined, I would argue for keeping defamilisation and degenderisation strictly separated: while defamilisation is about the unit providing welfare, degenderisation is about gender roles and hence about gender distributions within these units.

The benefit of separating both concepts is illustrated in Table 2-2, where the welfare state typology presented in Ciccia and Verloo (2012) is divided by whether the prototypical models are gendered or degendered, and familial or defamilial. The male breadwinner model has a strongly gendered division of labour and is highly familial; the caregiver parity model also considers a gendered division of labour and family care (social familialism), but supports carers with an income (economically defamilial); the universal caregiver model, Fraser's (1994) political ideal, on the other hand, is degendered though at the same time gives (limited) care responsibilities to the family, resulting in partial social and economic defamilisation; finally, the universal breadwinner is highly defamilial in terms of taking care responsibilities away from the family and having both men and women in the labour market, though such a formalisation does not necessarily involve degenderisation of care work.

Table 2-2 The typology by Ciccia and Verloo (2012) based on Fraser (1994), when defamilisation and degenderisation are separated

<table>
<tr><th></th><th colspan="2">Familial</th><th>Defamilial</th></tr>
<tr><td>Gendered</td><td>Male breadwinner</td><td colspan="2">Caregiver parity (soc. fam.; econ. defam.)</td></tr>
<tr><td>Degendered</td><td></td><td colspan="2">Universal caregiver (partial soc. and econ. defam.)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3"></td><td>Universal breadwinner</td></tr>
</table>

The concept of degenderisation should not be limited to the family sphere alone, but it should tackle gender equality and the gendered distribution of labour in welfare provision in general – that is, within the family, the market, and the state. Gender roles, and hence degenderisation, are part of the cultural context within which welfare is provided (see Figure 2-1), and thus it affects both the relation between the three different spheres of welfare provision and the welfare provision within each sphere. If the goal of degenderisation indeed is 'to eliminate gender roles' (Saxonberg, 2013, p. 32), then merely lifting family responsibilities will not do. That would only shift the gendered division of labour from unpaid to paid labour, as is the case at the moment with care still largely being a women's task: the Scandinavian countries are not only at the top in terms of female employment, they also have the highest occupational gender segregation in the world (Jarman, Blackburn & Racko, 2012; Kremer, 2007, p. 48). Even though the proposed separation of defamilisation and degenderisation might be read as a confirmation of Mary Daly's (2011, p. 2) statement that 'as family policy has come to the fore, gender has been cast in the shade', I would argue that the proposed conception of defamilisation is not 'gender blind': defamilisation is a gendered process, as is decommodification (Bolzendahl, 2010).

On a final note, Daly (2011) criticises the use of the term 'defamilisation', because it suggests the transition merely is one of responsibilities moving from the family to the state, disregarding changes of the family itself. However, this critique is the result of her interpretation of defamilisation as policies, overlooking the cultural element it entails (*supra*). Following León (2002), Daly (2011) proposes contrasting familisation and *individualisation* instead of the 'familisation-defamilisation' dichotomy. This coincides with Beck and Beck-Gernsheim's (2002) notion of 'institutionalised individualism', whereby institutions such as the welfare state focus more and more on provision for the individual rather than the group, in this case the family. Indeed, defamilisation is an individualisation process, on the condition that it creates alternative options the individual can choose from. However, following Pfau-Effinger's (2005; 2012) idea of 'welfare culture', Lewis (2006) argues that if policies

are optional, people are likely to act in accordance with gender culture, meaning that choice is still not entirely free. She suggests the incentives to steer individuals towards a more gender-equal division of care work (e.g., via 'daddy months'). Hence, Pascall and Lewis (2004, p. 390-391) argue that care and individualism can only go together in '[a]n inclusive citizenship version of the dual earner-dual carer model' in which '[s]ocial policies would assume that men and women equally need to earn for their own security and should have equal obligation to care for children and others' – in other words, when incomes are equal and individual, and care is equally shared.

2.2.6. DEFAMILISATION, LIFE COURSES AND FAMILY MODELS

The family is an important unit in the organisation of life courses (Krüger & Levy, 2001). Family life comes with mutual normative obligations that are typically gendered, rendering gendered life courses (Moen, 2011). While men's life courses are more homogeneous and work-centred, those of women are more complex and reflect the decisions regarding work and care women make throughout their active age years. Due to men's cumulative advantages by being able to focus on their careers, and the cumulative disadvantages for women when they decide to focus on family care, a 'network' of mutual dependencies is generated (Harrington Meyer & Parker, 2010), which is reflected by the life course concept of 'linked lives'.

One downside of the concept of defamilisation is that it focuses on specific policy fields, and hence cannot account for the full network of dependencies in a family, nor for how disadvantages are accumulated throughout life over these different fields. An approach in terms of *family models*, mapping cultural and policy-induced dependencies within and across generations, can offer a solution.

Lewis (2001) discusses how societies slowly move away from the male breadwinner model, which she describes as 'based on a set of assumptions about male and female contributions at the household level: men having the primary responsibility to earn and women to care for the young and the old. Female dependence was inscribed in the model' (p. 153). As a well-established norm in society, the male breadwinner model became engrained in social and family policies. As cultural norms changed in society and women became more work-oriented, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands tried to shift from a male breadwinner to an adult worker – or universal breadwinner (Fraser, 1994) or dual breadwinner (Montanari, 2009) – model as the basis for their policies (Lewis, 2001). Later, the adult worker model also became the main goal of the European Union's female employment agenda (Lewis, 2006). Unfortunately, the model is only concerned with women being in paid employment and overlooks the gendered division of unpaid care work (Lewis, 2006), resulting in a *de facto* 'one-and-a-half earner' model in which the husband works fulltime and the wife part-time, while policies 'increasingly tend to assume full individualization' (Lewis, 2001, p. 154). Also Duncan et al. (2003) criticise the adult worker model for assuming full individualism and actors based on an economic rationality, overlooking

norms, moral rationality and the negotiation of care work between partners. I would argue that the fundamental problem of the adult worker model is that it only considers one type of dependency – that of women on their husbands – and disregards the wider intergenerational network of dependencies that are connected to it.

The consensus is that the dual worker-dual carer model, whereby both partners are equally involved in the labour market and equally involved in unpaid care work is the ideal we have to strive for, yet is unattainable in the near future due to the remaining cultural norm of the gendered division of care work (Duncan et al., 2003; Fraser, 1994; Lewis, 2001).

2.2.7. CONCLUSION

There is much debate about what the concept of defamilisation exactly entails. Fundamentally, there is an agreement that defamilisation refers to the extent to which individuals are dependent on their family members for their well-being. However, there is much debate on the nature of this dependence. Does it refer to financial or care dependence? Does it only include dependencies generated by policies, or should it also refer to cultural dependencies? Moreover, family dependencies generated by policies can be both implicit and explicit. Parallel to Esping-Andersen's (1990) concept of decommodification entailing independence from the market, I propose a wide interpretation of defamilisation, referring to the degree of independence from the family for the individual's welfare and well-being. That means that policies should be evaluated by their outcomes in their respective (cultural) settings, rather than by some generic aspects of the policies themselves. I do, however, note that, while defamilisation might be an interesting tool to evaluate specific policies, family models are preferable when analysing family dependencies within a welfare state over the full life course.

The different articles in this dissertation refer to different aspects of defamilisation. Explicit familialism is very prominent in the Belgian pension system, as is exemplified in the article on poverty among retired women in Belgium. The state explicitly makes women dependent on their husbands, for instance by denying married women their own pension payments if their build-up is below a certain limit, and instead paying the husband a higher pension for having a dependent spouse. The Belgian pension system arguably contains certain aspects of implicit familialism as well, for instance by having a guaranteed income (a social assistance scheme specifically for the retired) well below the poverty line, making individuals with insufficient pension rights, typically women who are divorced or never married, dependent on the people around them.

The articles on childcare and eldercare, both referring to defamilisation or familialism in the text, can be placed within the discussion on whether the concept should refer to policies or outcomes – and the position of culture therein. The article on opinions

towards childcare creates clusters of welfare states based on outcomes such as female employment and childcare coverage rates. Moreover, the article on informal eldercare looks at outcomes as a dependent variable – rather literally, as it refers to the dependence of older individuals on their daughters to receive care –, and stipulates the importance of cultural norms in society to explain these outcomes. The clear importance of cultural variables on outcomes illustrates that policies should not be evaluated in a social vacuum, as some would suggest by critiquing an outcome-measurement of defamilisation, but instead that one should evaluate the policies in terms of their success within a specific cultural setting – that is, in terms of outcomes.

Finally, the article on retirement preferences does not deal with issues of dependence on the family, but it does show unequal treatment of men and women in retirement policies. As such, it helps to distinguish between the concepts of defamilisation and degenderisation. Gender-specific retirement ages are gendered policies, and hence the process of equalising retirement ages of men and women taking place in most Western European countries is a case of degenderisation. However, on the condition that women's pensions are sufficient to maintain one's standard of living, differences in official retirement ages do not necessarily make women dependent on their husbands, and therefore the equalisation of retirement ages is not a case of defamilisation.

The four articles illustrate the different aspects of the concept of defamilisation, as well as its limits. Belgian pension regulations are a case of explicit economic familialism, with benefits dependent on your current and past family situation. Moreover, by keeping large groups of women in poverty as a result of previous life events, the pension system arguably has some traits of implicit familialism as well, as these women likely need financial support from the people around them. The paper on eldercare is an example of social familialism and demonstrates the effect of familialist norms on women's behaviour and its consequences, providing evidence of the strong cultural impact on the level of familial support. This strengthens my conviction that we should conceive familialism and defamilisation in terms of outcomes, accounting for both policies and cultural norms, as much of the effect of policies is dependent on these norms. Finally, the paper on retirement preferences can illustrate the boundary between defamilisation and degenderisation. While most post-communist countries still have a gender difference in retirement ages, Western European countries have 'degenderised' their retirement ages and closed the gap between the retirement ages for men and women over the years – the United Kingdom being a notable exception. Even though this is a clear case of degenderisation, this transition has little to do with dependence on the family, being the core of defamilisation.

CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY

All four papers included in this dissertation rely on quantitative analysis of different data sources, both survey and register data. In this section, I assume a basic understanding of linear regression and elaborate on two specific deviations from the simple linear regression (i.e., ordinary least squares regression) model. First, multilevel analysis is a useful technique when one wants to know whether macro-level contexts affect individuals, and hence is a logical methodological choice in this dissertation focusing on how cultural values and policies in a country affect individuals' ideas and actions. Second, logistic regression is used in the case of a binary dependent variable. Here, it is used in the article on pension outcomes, assessing which women are poor and which are not depending on their life courses and the pension regulations in Belgium. After a brief discussion on these methods, their advantages and their disadvantages, I make some critical remarks about how the methods have been used in the different articles.

3.1. MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS

Three articles in this dissertation deal with individuals from several countries (the articles on childcare opinions, retirement preferences and informal eldercare). As their dependent variables are (quasi-)interval scaled, linear regression is the logical choice. However, because the respondents live in certain countries, the assumption of independence of the error terms made in simple linear regression is not respected (Hox, 2002; Luke, 2004; Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008, p. 55). The *dependence of error terms* increases the probability of Type I error (Hox, 2002; Kreft & de Leeuw, 1998; Luke, 2004), meaning an increased risk of rejecting the null hypothesis of the absence of an effect when it is actually true (i.e., a 'false positive'). Multilevel analysis overcomes this problem by accounting for the hierarchical structure of the data and splitting the error term into between-country error and within-country variance (Kreft & de Leeuw, 1998; Luke, 2004).

The level of dependence of the error terms is indicated by the *intra-class correlation coefficient*, which is calculated in an empty or intercept-only model, that is, a model without variables on either level (Hox, 2002; Luke, 2004). It shows to what extent total variance in the dependent variable is attributable to differences between higher-level units (countries, in the studies included here):

> The intra-class correlation is a measure of the degree of dependence of individuals. The more individuals share common experiences due to closeness in space and/or time, the more they are similar, or to a certain extent, duplications of each other. (Kreft & de Leeuw, 1998, p. 9)

Apart from statistical (the assumption of independent error terms) and empirical reasons to apply multilevel analysis (the intra-class correlation coefficient), Luke (2004) also refers to theoretical reasons to apply this technique: if the theoretical model used in the research refers to mechanisms working at *different levels of analysis*, then the multilevel analysis is required. That is indeed the case in all three studies in this dissertation including multilevel analysis: they hypothesise that macro-level institutions (both policies and cultural factors) impact opinions, preferences and actions of individuals.[13]

Multilevel analysis can refer to both random intercept models and random slope models. A random intercept model with one independent variable has the following form in the *micro*-part of the equation (Gill & Womack, 2013):

$$y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + x_{ij}\beta_1 + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

The outcome variable *y* for the *i*th case of the *j*th group[14] equals the intercept for the *j*th group (β_{0j}), plus the value that *i*th case of the *j*th group has on the independent variable *x* multiplied by a coefficient (β_1) and some error (ε_{ij}). From this model, it is clear that the coefficient for variable *x* (β_1) is the same for all groups in the regression – and hence is fixed –, while the intercept (β_{0j}) is specific to the group – meaning that it consists of a fixed component (i.e., the mean intercept) and a random component (i.e., the group's deviance from this mean) (Gill & Womack, 2013):

$$\beta_{0j} = \beta_0 + u_{0j}$$

In this *macro* equation, β_0 is the mean intercept (the fixed component) and u_{0j} is the group-specific error (the random component or the deviance from the mean). Just like in normal regression, error is assumed to follow a normal distribution, meaning that the group-specific intercepts should be normally distributed around the mean intercept (Gill & Womack, 2013; Hox, 2002). It is this error distribution in country-intercepts that can be explained by adding country-level variables to the model.[15] In

[13] There are alternative research designs allowing for the assessment of differences between countries, such as comparative case studies of just a few countries. However, as countries consist of a complex mix of political (state) and cultural (society) institutions, they tend to differ on more than one or just a few aspects, making it difficult to argue that observed differences between countries are the result of particular norms or policies. As multilevel analysis allows for the inclusion of and control for multiple variables, it is more suitable to pinpoint which policies and/or norms are responsible for a particular outcome.

[14] 'Case' refers to the micro-level, here the individual; 'group' refers to the macro-level, here the country.

[15] Note that also individual-level variables can affect country-level variance (*infra*).

sum, the random intercept means the expectation that the outcome variable differs across countries and allows us to model individual-level outcomes using country-level variables (Luke, 2004).

In the papers included in the dissertation, I limit myself to *random intercept models*, meaning that the intercept is random but the regression coefficients are fixed. As such, I assume that individual-level variables have the same impact on the dependent variable in all countries (Kreft & de Leeuw, 1998; Luke, 2004). This approach might be especially problematic for one particular variable ('filial care') in the paper on informal eldercare. In the paper, I include some cross-level interaction terms, meaning interactions between variables at the individual level and variables at the country-level (i.e., the interaction between filial care on the one hand and female labour market participation and eldercare norms in society on the other). While the paper treats all regression coefficients as fixed effects, the inclusion of interaction terms in fact means that the slope of the caregiving variable is dependent on the context. Therefore, I should include filial care as a random rather than a fixed effect in the regression. This coincides with Hox's (2002) stepwise multilevel model construction, whereby cross-level interaction terms are only added to the model after the individual-level variable concerned is included as a random effect. Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008, p. 61), on the other hand, argue that it is only relevant to include random effects when the higher-level units are randomly selected and it is the aim of the study to generalise results to a wider population of these units. That is not the case here, as will be discussed later in this section.

As the total variance is split into individual and country level variance, a simple R^2 measure is not an indicator of explained variance in multilevel analysis. Therefore, different methods are used to compare the *goodness of fit* of different models. Based on maximum likelihood estimation, deviance (i.e., -2 log likelihood) is a core measure of model fit in multilevel analysis (Hox, 2002). The measure indicates to what extent there is a 'lack of fit between the data and the model' (Luke, 2004, p. 34). Even though the measure in itself cannot be interpreted, it can be used to compare the performance of nested models in a fixed sample (Hox, 2002). However, much like with R^2, the deviance measure will indicate a better fit when variables are added to the model, no matter how well they predict the dependent variable, conflicting with the principle of parsimony. Hence, derived measures such as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) add a 'penalty' to the deviance for every variable included: it simply adds double the number of parameters used in the model to the deviance statistic (Hox, 2002; Luke, 2004).

Also pseudo-R^2 measures have been developed to compare goodness of fit of multilevel models, giving one R^2 measure for the lower level and another one for the higher level of analysis (Hox, 2002; Luke, 2004). These pseudo-R^2 measures represent the 'proportional reduction' in total error variance for each level of analysis (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008, p. 102-104). I use such a measure in the paper on

opinions towards government support for childcare for working parents. Though these measures 'mimic' the normal R^2 in ordinary linear regression, they are not entirely the same and run the risk of underestimating the variance explained or even yielding negative results (Hox, 2002; Luke, 2004) because higher level variance can not only decrease, but also increase, when variables at the lower level are added to the model (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008, p. 104). Indeed, in some of the models including only individual-level variables, the R^2 measure for the country level is slightly below zero. Therefore, such R^2 measures should only be interpreted in terms of reduction of error and used for the comparison of models, and not be interpreted in terms of explained variance (Luke, 2004).

The relation between lower level variables and higher level variance leads to a supplementary problem. If important country-level variables are not controlled for, a situation of *omitted variable bias* or endogeneity can occur when these omitted variables are correlated with individual-level variables. In this case, the individual-level variables become correlated with the country-level error terms, which can lead to a misspecification of the effects of the lower-level variables (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008, p. 114-115). This problem can be solved by splitting the lower-level variable into two: one containing the country-means of the individual-level variable, and a second one where the individual-level variable within every country is centred around this country-average (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008, p. 115). Because the individual-level variable is split up into a country-level and an individual-level variable, the latter is uncorrelated with the error term at the country level, solving the specification problem. Unfortunately, I did not know about this problem, as studies in the field of social policy applying multilevel analysis techniques tend to not pay attention to this problem either. A control of the well-being analyses in the paper on eldercare indicates that most coefficients are not affected by omitted variable bias, though that there might be a problem with the dummy variable on high intensity caregiving. I will explore this further in the review process of the paper.

To conclude this section on multilevel analysis, I have two reflections regarding the aggregate level. First, the countries in the analyses are not randomly selected, meaning that the error terms at the higher level are not really random. This poses important questions regarding the generalisability of the effects of country-level variables found in the different articles. First, only European countries are included, implying that any generalisation beyond the European borders would be 'walking on thin ice'. A generalisation from the selection of countries included to all of Europe is less problematic, but would involve the assumption that countries' decisions to participate in these international survey programmes such as the European Social Survey (ESS) and the Survey on Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) are unrelated to the variables included in the analysis. The second reflection is more fundamental in nature, and is related to the place of culture within the hierarchical data structure. By placing cultural variables at the macro-level, it is assumed that norms are in fact homogeneous in society, denying the variation of norms existing in

society. However, as there are no clearly defined and delineated cultural groups to which individuals belong, it is not possible to include cultural groups in the hierarchical model in between the individual and the country-level. Hence, even if there are good theoretical reasons to consider culture as a factor at the meso-level, it is not possible to operationalise it as such.

3.2. LOGISTIC REGRESSION

In the article on poverty among retired women in Belgium, the dependent variable in the study is whether women are poor or not, a *categorical variable* with two categories: poor and not poor. As there are only two possible answer categories, the assumption of normally distributed error terms made in linear regression is not respected (Hosmer, Lemeshow & Sturdivant, 2013, p. 7; Menard, 2002; Mood, 2010). Therefore, linear regression will not render optimal estimations of individuals' probabilities of being in poverty. Moreover, linear regression assumes a constant increase in the probability of the dependent variable per unit increase in the independent variable, while these *probability distributions are non-linear*: there are 'floor' and 'ceiling effects', meaning that the probability curve bends off so as to approach zero, respectively one, but not to cross it (Agresti, 2010, p. 5; Kleinbaum & Klein, 2010, p. 6; Pampel, 2000). By neglecting the floor and ceiling effects, linear regression can render impossible results, whereby individuals are assigned a predicted probability outside the range of zero and one (Harrell, 2001, p. 215-216; Kleinbaum & Klein, 2010, p. 5-6; Menard, 2002; Mood, 2010; Pampel, 2000). Moreover, linear regression on a binary dependent variable (i.e., a linear probability modelling) breaches the assumption of *homoscedasticity* in linear regression, leading to less precise estimates (Menard, 2002; Mood, 2010). Logistic regression circumvents these problems.

Instead of using the real values, 1 for 'poor' and 0 for 'not poor', the method relies on the probability of being poor for an individual with certain characteristics (e.g., 0.6 if six out of ten individuals at a certain age are in poverty). As the resulting line of probabilities is not linear, it cannot be estimated in a regression – linearity being another assumption in regression. Hence, the dependent variable is *transformed* twice in order to make it linear: first, probabilities are turned into odds, which have an exponential function; and then we take the natural logarithm of the odds so as to transform the exponential into a linear function (Menard, 2002; Pampel, 2000). Hence, in *logistic regression*, the log of the odds of the dependent variable is calculated. If the regression coefficients (logit coefficients) are negative, an increase in the independent variable coincides with a decrease in probabilities on the dependent variable; positive logit coefficients mean that probabilities increase with a higher value on the independent variable. However, the interpretation of the values

of logit coefficients is not straightforward, which is why I prefer to indicate the size of an effect by calculating the probabilities for a number of specific type-cases.[16]

As binary dependent variables are not normally distributed, variance-based indicators for the goodness of fit such as the explained variance (R^2) used in linear regression do not apply to logistic regression. For a comparison of the *goodness of fit* of nested logistic regression models, we can use the -2 log likelihood score or derived measures such as the AIC (Menard, 2002) – the lower the -2 log likelihood or the AIC, the better. The latter promotes parsimony by penalising for adding extra variables in the model (Agresti, 2007, p. 141-142). Hence, the improvement in -2 log likelihood for adding an extra variable to the model should be big enough to compensate for the penalty of adding the extra variable.

Logistic regression, however, has a problem of '*unobserved heterogeneity*', meaning that coefficients are not only affected by the effect of their respective independent variables on the outcome variable, but also by the 'unobserved' variables that are not included in the model (Allison, 1999; Mood, 2010; Williams, 2009). Therefore, comparing effects over different models or different samples is not as straightforward as it is in linear regression. In logistic regression, a standard logistic distribution is assumed, meaning that the unexplained variance (i.e., the equivalent of the error term in linear regression) is fixed (Allison, 1999; Mood, 2010). As a result, when the explained variance of the model increases due to adding relevant variables, the total variance of the dependent variable is forced to increase by adapting its scale. By adapting the scale of the dependent variable, the coefficients of the independent variables in the model also have to change (Mood, 2010). In Mood's (2010, p. 69) words, 'we standardise the true coefficients β_1 so that the residuals can have the variance of the standard logistic distribution'. Hence, the scale of the dependent variable, and therefore the size of the coefficients, are dependent on the unobserved heterogeneity in the model.

The question remains how we can compare logit effect sizes over different models or samples despite the problem of unobserved heterogeneity. First, as far as explaining effects away through the inclusion of new variables is concerned, unobserved heterogeneity is not a problem because the problem makes us underestimate effect sizes: 'even if we do not know the *size* of the impact of unobserved heterogeneity (…), we always know the *direction* of the impact: it can only lead to an *underestimation* of the effect' (Mood, 2010, p. 72, emphasis in original). Further, Mood (2010) proposes some solutions in order to be able to compare effects across samples and models. In the paper on poverty among retired women in Belgium, we

[16] There are also other methods to express the size of an effect, such as marginal average effects. However, I prefer the type-cases as they make the results more 'tangible': it makes it easier to understand the exact impact a variable on average has in a concrete situation.

use three methods with a focus on comparison between samples, as differences between women depending on their marital status is the core of what the paper is about: 'Allison's procedure' (comparing between samples), heterogeneous choice models (comparing between samples) and linear probability models (comparing between samples and models). As the latter refers to applying simple linear regression to a binary dependent variable (for a defence of linear probability models, see Hellevik, 2009), these problems of unobserved heterogeneity that are specific to logistic regression do not apply.

Regarding the comparison of coefficients across samples for a specific model, unobserved heterogeneity is only problematic if the unobserved heterogeneity is bigger for one group than for another – when certain omitted variables have a stronger impact on the dependent variable in certain samples than in others (Williams, 2009). Allison (1999) tries to overcome this problem by adjusting for unequal residual variation (i.e., unobserved heterogeneity) through the comparison of the sum of the log likelihoods of the model in the separate samples with that of one model for the total sample and a dummy variable distinguishing the separate groups.[17] The author supplies a SAS macro (*glogit*) that produces these adjusted results and compares them across the different samples. In the paper, we make use of this macro to compare the coefficients across models. According to Williams (2009), however, Allison's approach potentially leads to wrong conclusions and an underestimation of differences between groups. The problem, according to Williams (2009), is that Allison's method to adjust coefficients for unobserved heterogeneity requires the assumption that at least one coefficient in the model is the same in all samples for the procedure. Heterogeneous choice models, Williams (2009) states, do not require this assumption and simply allow for the inclusion of interaction terms between the grouping variable and the variables in the model to assess the difference in effect sizes between samples. Following Williams (2009), we use the user-written STATA command *oglm* (ordinal generalised linear models) to perform these tests.

In the paper on informal eldercare, I apply logistic regression for a dependent variable with three categories: 'does not give care', 'gives care up to twice a week', and 'gives care more than twice a week'. However, the dependent variable is not nominal but ordinal, so an ordinal or 'cumulative' logit model (Agresti, 2007, p. 180; 2010) could have yielded more precise results in terms of significance, as it would take into account the ordinal structure of the variable. Moreover, because not all data are taken into account simultaneously, the samples differ from model to model, which renders comparison between models in terms of goodness of fit indicators such as AIC impossible. I run binary logistic regressions, each comparing two response categories, as I thought ordinal logistic regression would be rather complicated given

[17] Williams (2009, p. 535-536) presents a brief and clear summary of Allison's (1999) procedure.

the multilevel structure of the data. Based on these problems, however, I am planning to apply a different analysis technique based on Agresti's (2010, p. 282-288) discussion of ordinal generalised liner mixed models when adapting the paper during the review process.

CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSION

I started this dissertation by asking: '*How are opinions, preferences and actions related to women's conditions and their roles in social policy throughout the life course?*' In order to connect opinions, preferences, actions and conditions or outcomes in relation to social policies, I gave a brief overview of rational choice, sociological and historical institutionalism and their respective logics of calculation, appropriateness and path dependence. Subsequently, I discussed the concept of 'defamilisation', around which the debate on the position of the woman in social policy evolves. Then I briefly presented the methods used in the four papers. In this concluding chapter, I relate the articles back to the theoretical framework.

I discussed the problem of what opinions exactly are within institutionalist theory, and the consequences it has for studying opinions. Within a rational choice framework, opinions are only relevant as far as they reflect concrete preferences for actions. In this case, welfare opinions reflect the self-interest of a utility-maximising individual, meaning that they can be influenced by whether the individual would benefit from the specific welfare scheme. From a sociological institutionalist perspective, opinions could reflect both mental models, being sets of internalised norms and ideas, or preferences. However, their positioning as either reflections of mental models or preferences have contradictory consequences within the theory. If opinions are reflections of mental models, then we can expect cultural variables in society to affect them. However, that would also mean that it would be meaningless to explain the opinions with other opinions, because they are both part of the same mental models and hence cannot have a causal relationship – at best a correlating one. Alternatively, opinions are preferences, in which case it would make sense to explain them with other variables reflecting mental models, such as variables containing aspects of ideologies. In this case, however, we cannot use cultural variables as explanatory variables in the model, as cultural norms only affect preferences through internalisation into the individual's mental models. In sum, based on theoretical considerations, one can either classify opinions as mental models and explain them with variables referring to cultural norms in society, or consider them as preferences in which case ideology and self-interest can be used as explanatory variables.

In the paper dealing with opinions, *Do self-interest, ideology and national context influence opinions on government support for childcare for working parents? A multilevel analysis*, little evidence is found for rational choice explanations of opinions and, even though it performs better, the ideology hypothesis is not particularly good at explaining whether individuals want the government to support childcare services for working parents. Though variation at the country-level is limited, country-level explanations such as the cultural effects hypothesis reveal much more important effects.

I see three possible answers for why both culture on the one hand and ideology and rational choice explanations on the other can affect opinions simultaneously. First, 'opinions' are a hybrid concept and consist of both elements of mental models and preferences. We can include elements of both into the question used in the article. The question may refer to individuals' fundamental ideas about the role of the state and the family, for instance the explicit reference to the government support only applying to working parents brings an element of self-interest and thus preference into the question. A second possible explanation could be desirability response bias, in which the respondent answers the question in line with what he or she thinks is a 'good' answer for the country, rather than giving his or her own opinion. That could explain why cultural effects remain despite controlling for the individual's world views. However, if this were the case, it is hard to see why the other variables related to the individual's ideology were not affected by the same bias. A third explanation for why cultural effects remain despite controlling for the individual's ideology could be the 'illusion of control'. By this, I mean that I simply have not managed to include the right or sufficient variables related to the ideology hypothesis to fully control for the individual's relevant world views in light of the dependent variable. If this is the case, the cultural variables may capture the effects of the non-controlled-for aspects of the individual's ideology. It is up to future research to clarify the conceptual position of opinions and to merge the welfare state opinion literature with the insights from institutionalism.

In the article dealing with retirement preferences, *When do people want to retire? The preferred retirement age gap between Eastern and Western Europe explained*, six cultural variables related to ideas in society about old age and ageism were used as control variables, though none affected the dependent variable – which is what we could theoretically expect from a pure preference measure. The article assesses to what extent job characteristics and the formal retirement age affect retirement preferences. The fact that indicators about mental and physical well-being did not manage to account for the effect of job characteristics on retirement preferences, indeed indicates that retirement is a complex decision in which a multitude of factors play a role. One possible explanation could be that individuals in jobs with more favourable characteristics identify themselves more strongly with their work, and hence would prefer to retire later.

The article shows that legal retirement ages have an important impact on when individuals want to retire. The fact that a lower legal retirement age coincides with preferences to retire earlier, makes sense from a rational choice perspective. However, no effect of the existence of early retirement schemes on retirement preferences was found, while one would expect that to be the case in this approach. Based on this finding, it seems reasonable to perceive the effect of the formal retirement age rather as the consequence of the fact that a formal retirement age sets a norm individuals internalise and feel they should live up to. Increases in the legal retirement age are a good opportunity to test the idea that retirement ages turn into

norms, as one would expect the norms to adapt to the new retirement age with some delay. Unfortunately, too few countries had an increase in their retirement age in the years before data collection to find significant results. However, the fact that Swedes preferred to retire much earlier than could be expected based on their average characteristics, could point in this direction: Sweden was one of the few countries which did increase the retirement age in that period.

After having discussed opinions and preferences, the paper *Culture matters: Employment, informal eldercare and caregiver burden in Europe* discusses actions and outcomes. In the paper, I analyse women's involvement in informal eldercare, and how it affects their well-being. There is very little variation between countries in terms of giving care: in all countries, around 15-20 per cent of women between 50 and 65 with at least one living parent or parent-in-law provides care for the latter. While the share of family carers is more or less the same in all countries, the amount of care they give varies greatly between countries. Not the caregiving itself, but the care intensity is dependent on cultural factors: in countries where eldercare is considered a family responsibility, caregivers are more involved in high-intensity care. Policies are not included in the analyses. Unlike in social security schemes such as retirement pensions, where the same rules apply to everyone in the country, lower-level governments such as municipalities tend to be more involved in welfare services such as eldercare in many countries. This makes it very difficult to measure the impact of policies on care in international surveys. Also in this study, I find little support for rational choice theory. Rational choice theorists would typically expect a trade-off between employment and care, which does not appear in the data. Employment affects neither caregiving nor care intensity. Unfortunately, information about the individual's mental models and preferences related to employment and caregiving are not available in the dataset.

In the article, I also take the next step and look at outcomes – in this case well-being of the caregiver. Outcomes are important as they can be a cause of change in institutionalist theory, especially when the outcome of an action is considered as undesirable or conflicting with one's ideas about what is right and what is wrong. The analyses show that the impact of caregiving on well-being is highly dependent on the cultural setting, and hence likely the consequence of women experiencing conflicts between what they perceive as their role and their actions. In countries where eldercare is not considered a family responsibility and countries with a high female labour market participation rate for the age group in question, I find the lowest well-being among women who give intensive care and are not employed, while the highest well-being is found among women who are employed – with few differences between carers and non-carers. In countries where eldercare is considered a family responsibility by a large majority and in countries with low employment rates among women between 50 and 65, the lowest well-being is found among non-carers, especially when they are not employed. Here, the highest well-being is found among women combining both full-time employment and intensive informal caregiving.

This evidence supports sociological institutionalist ideas about how individuals can experience strain when their actions do not coincide with their internalised norms.

The final article, *Lifecourses, pensions and poverty among elderly women in Belgium: Interactions between family history, work history and pension regulations*, deals with how women's life courses shape specific outcomes in terms of poverty depending on the regulations in place. Belgian pension policy is an exemplary case of path dependence, with policy development lagging behind on major societal changes taking place in the second half of the 20th Century, primarily in terms of family developments. The male breadwinner family remains the cornerstone of the pension system, in which women are very well protected against their primary risk in a male breadwinner society, namely widowhood. No matter your earlier life course and whether or not you have been employed at any time in your life, being a widow is sufficient for being protected against poverty after retirement. However, family forms not fitting within the male breadwinner model, such as women who never married or who are divorced, only yield limited protection – if any at all – and face a high risk of ending up in poverty after retirement. Another particularity is that of negative derived rights and the family rate: married women with limited pension entitlements do not receive their pension benefits, but instead their husbands receive a pension at the family rate, compensating them for having a dependent spouse. Such an outcome, showing that policies are to a large extent out of sync with society, even to such an extent that it pushes large groups of women into poverty after retirement as a result of a divorce earlier in life, could be a trigger for policy change.

Seen from a life course perspective, women have accumulated severe disadvantages as a result of their institutionalised life courses. First, in line with the male breadwinner model, social time schedules expected them to not be in the labour market, or at least retreat from paid employment and focus on the family once they marry. As norms changed over time and divorce became an acceptable option, several women terminated their marriage. Divorce indeed is a disruptive event in this case, as it means losing not only your husband but also the income he brought in before. In an attempt to cope with this situation, many divorced women re-entered the labour market. However, after retirement, the same divorce leads to a subsequent setback, as divorced women only receive limited pension entitlements for the period they were married and not employed. At the same time, the former husband does not see his pension affected in any way, meaning that the financial risk of the divorce lies fully with the dependent spouse – at least as far as retirement pensions are concerned.

The four articles illustrate the different aspects of the concept of defamilisation, as well as its limits. Belgian pension regulations are a case of explicit economic familialism, with benefits dependent on your current and past family situation. Moreover, by keeping large groups of women in poverty as a result of previous life events, the pension system arguably has some traits of implicit familialism as well, as these women likely need financial support from the people around them. The paper

on eldercare is an example of social familialism and shows the effect of familialist norms on women's behaviour and its consequences, providing evidence of the strong cultural impact on the level of familial support. This strengthens my conviction that we should conceive familialism and defamilisation in terms of outcomes, accounting for both policies and cultural norms, as much of the effect of policies is dependent on these norms. Finally, the paper on retirement preferences can illustrate the boundary between defamilisation and degenderisation. While most post-communist countries still have a gender difference in retirement ages, Western European countries have 'degenderised' their retirement ages and closed the gap between the retirement ages for men and women over the years – the United Kingdom being a notable exception. Even though this is a clear case of degenderisation, this transition has little to do with dependence on the family, which is the core of defamilisation.

On a final note, I want to suggest a path for further research. This introduction has discussed and tried to combine three different traditions in research: institutionalism, defamilisation and life courses. A further integration of these three traditions could lead to better theoretical and empirical insights into the role policies play in the accumulation of disadvantages many women experience throughout the life course. Institutionalist theory offers a good framework to link the macro-level policies and cultures of the defamilisation literature to concrete life courses at the micro-level. Moreover, while most of the literature on defamilisation and gendered life courses focuses on women's lives during active age and its consequences for these women, a linked lives approach could include the perspectives of the other individuals in the dependency networks, too. This could generate new perspectives on how, under which circumstances and for whom certain policies create dependencies on the family.

LITERATURE LIST

Agresti, A. (2007). *An introduction to categorical data analysis*. Hoboken: Wiley.

Agresti, A. (2010). *Analysis of ordinal categorical data*. Hoboken: Wiley.

Alasuutari, P. (2015). The discursive side of New Institutionalism. *Cultural Sociology, 9*(2), 162-184.

Allison, P. D. (1999). Comparing logit and probit coefficients across groups. *Sociological Methods & Research*, *28*(2), 186-208.

Archer, M. (2004). *Being human: The problem of agency*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bambra, C. (2007). Defamilisation and welfare state regimes: A cluster analysis. *International Journal of Social Welfare*, *16*(4), 326-338.

Beck, U., & Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2002). *Individualization: Institutionalized individualism and its social and political consequences*. London: SAGE.

Becker, G. (1974). A theory of social interactions. *Journal of Political Economy, 82*(6), 1063-1093.

Bell, S. (2011). Do we really need a new 'constructivist institutionalism' to explain institutional change? *British Journal of Political Science*, *41*(4), 883-906.

Berger, P. A., Steinmuller, P., & Sopp, P. (1993). Differentiation of life-courses? Changing patterns of labour-market sequences in West Germany. *European Sociological Review*, *9*(1), 43-65.

Bevir, M., & Rhodes, R. A. W. (2010). *The state as cultural practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Blau, F. D., Ferber, M. A., & Winkler, A. E. (2010). *The economics of women, men, and work*. Upper Saddle River: Pearson.

Blome, A., Keck, W., & Alber, J. (2009). *Family and the welfare state in Europe: Intergenerational relations in ageing societies*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Bolzendahl, C. (2010). Directions of decommodification: Gender and generosity in 12 OECD nations, 1980-2000. *European Sociological Review*, *26*(2), 125-141.

Bonoli, G. (2001). Political institutions, veto points, and the process of welfare state adaptation. In P. Pierson (Ed.), *The new politics of the welfare state* (pp. 238-264). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bonoli, G. (2007). Too narrow and too wide at once: The 'welfare state' as dependent variable in policy analysis. In J. Clasen & N. A. Siegel (Eds.), *Investigating welfare state change: The 'dependent variable problem' in comparative analysis* (pp. 24-39). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Budig, M. J., Misra, J., & Boeckmann, I. (2012). The motherhood penalty in cross-national perspective: The importance of work-family policies and cultural attitudes. *Social Politics*, *19*(2), 163-193.

Buhari-Gulmez, D. (2010). Stanford School on sociological institutionalism: A global cultural approach. *International Political Sociology*, *4*(3), 253-270.

Campbell, I., & van Wanrooy, B. (2013). Long working hours and working-time preferences: Between desirability and feasibility. *Human Relations*, *66*(8), 1131-1155.

Chiappori, P.-A., & Lewbel, A. (2015). Gary Becker's a theory of the allocation of time. *The Economic Journal*, *125*(583), 410-442.

Ciccia, R., & Bleijenbergh, I. (2014). After the male breadwinner model? Childcare services and the division of labor in European countries. *Social Politics*, *21*(1), 50-79.

Ciccia, R., & Verloo, M. (2012). Parental leave regulations and the persistence of the male breadwinner model: Using fuzzy-set ideal type analysis to assess gender equality in an enlarged Europe. *Journal of European Social Policy*, *22*(5), 507-528.

Clasen, J. (2005). *Reforming European welfare states: Germany and the United Kingdom compared*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Clemens, E. S., & Cook, J. M. (1999). Politics and institutionalism: Explaining durability and change. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *25*, 441-466.

Cloïn, M., Keuzenkamp, S., & Plantenga, J. (2011). A matter of culture and cost? A comparison of the employment decisions made by mothers with a lower, intermediate and higher level of education in the Netherlands. *Work, Employment and Society*, *25*(3), 468-486.

Cooke, L. P. (2006). Policy, preferences, and patriarchy: The division of domestic labor in East Germany, West Germany, and the United States. *Social Politics, 13*(1), 117-143.

Cooke, M. (2006). Policy changes and the labour force participation of older workers: Evidence from six countries. *Canadian Journal on Aging / La Revue Canadienne du Vieillissement, 25*(4), 387-400.

Crompton, R., & Lyonette, C. (2005). The new gender essentialism – domestic and family 'choices' and their relation to attitudes. *British Journal of Sociology, 56*(4), 601-620.

Crompton, R., & Lyonette, C. (2006). Some issues in cross-national comparative research methods: A comparison of attitudes to promotion, and women's employment, in Britain and Portugal. *Work, Employment & Society, 20*(2), 403-414.

Daly, M. (2011). What adult worker model? A critical look at recent social policy reform in Europe from a gender and family perspective. *Social Politics, 18*(1), 1-23.

Dannefer, D. (2010). Age, the life course, and the sociological imagination: Prospects for theory. In R. H. Binstock & L. K. George (Eds.), *Handbook of aging and the social sciences, 7th Edition* (pp. 3-16). Cambridge: Academic Press.

Debacker, M. (2008). Care strategies among high- and low-skilled mothers: A world of difference? *Work, Employment and Society, 22*(3), 527-545.

Denzau, A. T., & North, D. C. (1994). Shared mental models: Ideologies and institutions. *Kyklos, 47*(1), 3-31.

Duncan, S., Edwards, R., Reynolds, T., & Alldred, P. (2003). Motherhood, paid work and partnering: Values and theories. *Work, Employment and Society, 17*(2), 309-330.

Duncan, S., & Irwin, S. (2004). The social patterning of values and rationalities: Mothers' choices in combining caring and employment. *Social Policy and Society, 3*(4), 391-399.

Edeling, T. (1998). Economic and sociological institutionalism in organization theory: Two sides of the same coin? *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics / Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 154*(4), 728-734.

Escobedo, A. (1999). Work-family arrangements in Spain: Family adjustments to labour market imbalances. In L. den Dulk, A. van Doorne-Huiskes & J. Schippers (Eds.), *Work-family arrangements in Europe* (pp. 103-127). Amsterdam: Thela Thesis.

Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). *The three worlds of welfare capitalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Esping-Andersen, G. (1999). *Social foundations of postindustrial economies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Esping-Andersen, G. (2009). *The incomplete revolution: Adapting to women's new roles*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Eurostat (2015). Employment rate of the total population, men and women, age group 20-64 (tesem010). Online available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/employment-and-social-inclusion-indicators/employment-guidlines/indicators.

Ferragina, E., & Seeleib-Kaiser, M. (2015). Determinants of a silent (r)evolution: Understanding the expansion of family policy in rich OECD countries. *Social Politics*, *22*(1), 1-37.

Fershtman, C., Gneezy, U., & Hoffman, M. (2011). Taboos and identity: Considering the unthinkable. *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics*, *3*(2), 139-164

Finnemore, M. (1996). Norms, culture, and world politics: Insights from sociology's institutionalism. *International Organization*, *50*(2), 325-347.

Fodor, E., & Kispeter, E. (2014). Making the 'reserve army' invisible: Lengthy parental leave and women's economic marginalisation in Hungary. *European Journal of Women's Studies*, *21*(4), 382-398.

Fraser, N. (1994). After the family wage: Gender equality and the welfare state. *Political Theory*, *22*(4), 591-618.

Gaunt, R., & Scott, J. (2014). Parents' involvement in childcare: Do parental and work identities matter? *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, *38*(4), 475-489.

Gill, J., & Womack, A. J. (2013). The multilevel model framework. In M. A. Scott, J. S. Simonoff & B. D. Marx (Eds.), *The SAGE handbook of multilevel modeling* (pp. 3-20). London: SAGE.

Ginosar, A. (2014). Public-interest institutionalism: A positive perspective on regulation. *Administration & Society*, *46*(3), 301-317.

Grendstad, G., & Selle, P. (1995). Cultural theory and the new institutionalism. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, *7*(1), 5-27.

Hagelskamp, C., Hughes, D., Yoshikawa, H., & Chaudry, A. (2011). Negotiating motherhood and work: A typology of role identity associations among low-income, urban women. *Community, Work & Family*, *14*(3), 335-366.

Hakim, C. (2000). Work-lifestyle choices in the 21st century: Preference theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hall, P. A., & Taylor, R. C. R. (1996). Political science and the three new institutionalisms. *Political Studies*, *44*(5), 936-957.

Han, S.-K., & Moen, P. (1999). Clocking out: Temporal patterning of retirement. *American Journal of Sociology*, *105*(1), 191-236.

Harrell, F. E. (2001). *Regression modeling strategies: With applications to linear models, logistic regression, and survival analysis*. New York: Springer.

Harrington Meyer, M., & Parker, W. M. (2010). Gender, aging, and social policy. In R. H. Binstock & L. K. George (Eds.), *Handbook of aging and the social sciences, 7th Edition* (pp. 323-335). Cambridge: Academic Press.

Hay, C. (2004). Ideas, interests and institutions in the comparative political economy of great transformations. *Review of International Political Economy*, *11*(1), 204-226.

Hay, C. (2006). Constructivist institutionalism. In R. A. W. Rhodes, S. A. Binder, & B. A. Rockman (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of political institutions* (pp. 56-74). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hellevik, O. (2009). Linear versus logistic regression when the dependent variable is a dichotomy. *Quality & Quantity*, *43*(1), 59-74.

Hodgson, G. M. (2007). Institutions and individuals: Interaction and evolution. *Organization Studies*, *28*(1), 95-116.

Hook, J. L. (2015). Incorporating ‘class’ into work–family arrangements: Insights from and for three worlds. *Journal of European Social Policy*, *25*(1), 14-31.

Hosmer, D. W., Lemeshow, S., & Sturdivant, R. X. (2013). *Applied logistic regression*. Hoboken: Wiley.

Hox, J. (2002). *Multilevel analysis: Techniques and applications*. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Immergut, E. M. (1998). The theoretical core of the new institutionalism. *Politics & Society*, *26*(1), 5-34.

James, L. (2009) Generational differences in women's attitudes towards paid employment in a British city: The role of habitus. *Gender, Place & Culture*, *16*(3), 313-328.

Jarman, J., Blackburn, R. M., & Racko, G. (2012). The dimensions of occupational gender segregation in industrial countries. *Sociology*, *46*(6), 1003-1019.

Javornik, J. (2014). Measuring state de-familialism: Contesting post-socialist exceptionalism. *Journal of European Social Policy*, *24*(3), 240-257.

Jensen, P. H. (1996). *Komparative Velfærdssystemer: Kvinders reproduktionsstrategier mellem familien, velfærdsstaten og arbejdsmarkedet*. Copenhagen: Nyt fra Samfundsvidenskaberne.

Jensen, P. H., & Møberg, R. J. (2011). Tensions related to the transition of elderly care from an unpaid to a paid activity. In B. Pfau-Effinger & T. Rostgaard (Eds.), *Care between work and welfare in European societies* (pp. 98-114). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Johnstone, M., & Lee, C. (2016). Lifestyle preference theory: No match for young Australian women. *Journal of Sociology*, *52*(2), 249-265.

Kan, M. Y. (2007). Work orientation and wives' employment careers: An evaluation of Hakim's preference theory. *Work and Occupations*, *34*(4), 430-462.

Kangas, O., & Rostgaard, T. (2007). Preferences or institutions? Work–family life opportunities in seven European countries. *Journal of European Social Policy*, *17*(3), 240-256.

Kangas, A., & Vestheim, G. (2010). Institutionalism, cultural institutions and cultural policy in the Nordic countries. *Nordisk Kulturpolitisk Tidsskrift*, *13*(2), 267-286.

Kanji, S. (2011). What keeps mothers in full-time employment? *European Sociological Review*, *27*(4), 509-525.

Kanji, S., & Cahusac, E. (2015). Who am I? Mothers' shifting identities, loss and sensemaking after workplace exit. *Human Relations*, *68*(9), 1415-1436.

Kickert, W. J. M., & van der Meer, F.-B. (2011). Small, slow, and gradual reform: What can historical institutionalism teach us? *International Journal of Public Administration*, *34*(8), 475-485.

Kitschelt, H. (2001). Partisan competition and welfare state retrenchment: When do politicians choose unpopular policies? In P. Pierson (Ed.), *The new politics of the welfare state* (pp. 265-302). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kleider, H. (2015). Paid and unpaid work: The impact of social policies on the gender division of labour. *Journal of European Social Policy*, *25*(5), 505-520.

Kleinbaum, D. G., & Klein, M. (2010). *Logistic regression: A self-learning text*. New York: Springer.

Knijn, T., & Ostner, I. (2002). Commodification and de-commodification. In B. Hobson, J. Lewis & B. Siim (Eds.), *Contested concepts in gender and social politics* (pp. 141-169). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Knill, C., & Lenschow, A. (2001). "Seek and ye shall find!" Linking different perspectives on institutional change. *Comparative Political Studies*, *34*(2), 187-215.

Kohli, M. (2007). The institutionalization of the life course: Looking back to look ahead. *Research in Human Development*, *4*(3-4), 253-271.

Kreft, I. G., & de Leeuw, J. (1998). *Introducing multilevel modeling*. London: SAGE.

Kremer, M. (2007). *How welfare states care: Culture, gender and parenting in Europe*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Kröger, T. (2011). Defamilisation, dedomestication and care policy: Comparing childcare service provisions of welfare states. *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, *31*(7/8), 424-440.

Krüger, H., & Levy, R. (2001). Linking life courses, work, and the family: Theorizing a not so visible nexus between women and men. *The Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers Canadiens de Sociologie*, *26*(2), 145-166.

Kumra, S. (2010). Exploring career "choices" of work-centred women in a professional service firm. *Gender in Management: An International Journal*, *25*(3), 227-243.

Leitner, S. (2003). Varieties of familialism: The caring function of the family in comparative perspective. *European Societies*, *5*(4), 353-375.

Leitner, S., & Lessenich, S. (2007). (In)Dependence as dependent variable: Conceptualizing and measuring 'de-familization'. In J. Clasen & N.A. Siegel (Eds.), *Investigating welfare state change: The 'dependent variable problem' in comparative analysis* (pp. 244-260). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

León, M. (2002). Towards the individualization of social rights: Hidden familialistic practices in Spanish social policy. *South European Society and Politics*, *7*(3), 53-80.

Levy, R., Gauthier, J.-A., & Widmer, E. (2006). Entre contraintes institutionnelle et domestique: Les parcours de vie masculins et féminins en Suisse. *The Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers Canadiens de Sociologie*, *31*(4), 461-489.

Lewis, J. (1992). Gender and the development of welfare regimes. *Journal of European Social Policy*, *2*(3), 159-173.

Lewis, J. (2001). The decline of the male breadwinner model: Implications for work and care. *Social Politics*, *8*(2), 152-169.

Lewis, J. (2006). Employment and care: The policy problem, gender equality and the issue of choice. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis*, *8*(2), 103-114.

Likki, T., & Staerkle, C. (2015). Welfare support in Europe: Interplay of dependency culture beliefs and meritocratic contexts. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, *27*(1), 138-153.

Lister, R. (1997). *Citizenship: Feminist perspectives*. London: Macmillan.

Loretto, W., & Vickerstaff, S. (2012). The domestic and gendered context for retirement. *Human Relations*, *66*(1), 65-86.

Luke, D. A. (2004). *Multilevel modeling*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE.

Mackay, F., Kenny, M., & Chappell, L. (2010). New institutionalism through a gender lens: Towards a feminist institutionalism? *International Political Science Review*, *31*(5), 573-588.

Mackay, F., Monro, S., & Waylen, G. (2009). The feminist potential of sociological institutionalism. *Politics & Gender, 5*(2), 253-262.

Mahoney, J. (2000). Path dependence in historical sociology. *Theory and Society, 29*(4), 507-548.

March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1984). The new institutionalism: Organizational factors in political life. *The American Political Science Review, 78*(3), 734-749.

March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1989). *Rediscovering institutions: The organizational basis of politics*. New York: The Free Press.

March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (2006). Elaborating the "New Institutionalism". In R. A. W. Rhodes, S. A. Binder, & B. A. Rockman (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of political institutions* (pp. 3-20). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McDowell, L., Ray, K., Perrons, D., Fagan, C., & Ward, K. (2005). Women's paid work and moral economies of care. *Social & Cultural Geography, 6*(2), 219-235.

McLaughlin, E., & Glendinning, C. (1994). Paying for care in Europe: Is there a feminist approach? In L. Hantrais & S. Mangen (Eds.), *Family policy and the welfare of women* (pp. 52-69). Loughborough: University of Loughborough.

McMunn, A., Lacey, R., Worts, D., McDonough, P., Stafford, M., Booker, C. Kumari, M., & Sacker, A. (2015). De-standardization and gender convergence in work–family life courses in Great Britain: A multi-channel sequence analysis. *Advances in Life Course Research, 26*, 60-75.

McRae, S. (2003). Constraints and choices in mothers' employment careers: a consideration of Hakim's Preference Theory. *British Journal of Sociology, 54*(3), 317-338.

Menard, S. (2002). *Applied logistic regression analysis*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE.

Miller, E. A., & Banaszak-Holl, J. (2005). Cognitive and normative determinants of state policymaking behavior: Lessons from the sociological institutionalism. *Publius, 35*(2), 191-216.

Moen, P. (2011). From 'work-family' to the 'gendered life course' and 'fit': Five challenges to the field. Community. *Work & Family, 14*(1), 81-96.

Möhring, K. (2016). Life course regimes in Europe: Individual employment histories in comparative and historical perspective. *Journal of European Social Policy*, *26*(2), 124-139.

Montanari, I. (2009). Europe, women, and work: Is the "adult worker" ideal achieved? *International Journal of Health Services*, *39*(2), 245-269.

Mood, C. (2010). Logistic regression: Why we cannot do what we think we can do, and what we can do about it. *European Sociological Review*, *26*(1), 67-82.

Myles, J., & Pierson, P. (2001). The comparative political economy of pension reform. In P. Pierson (Ed.), *The new politics of the welfare state* (pp. 305-333). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Närvi, J. (2012). Negotiating care and career within institutional constraints – work insecurity and gendered ideals of parenthood in Finland. *Community, Work & Family*, *15*(4), 451-470.

North, D. C. (1990). A transaction cost theory of politics. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, *2*(4), 355-367.

O'Connor, J. S. (1993). Gender, class and citizenship in the comparative analysis of welfare state regimes: Theoretical and methodological issues. *British Journal of Sociology*, *44*(3), 501-518.

Olsen, J. P. (2007). Understanding institutions and logics of appropriateness: Introductory essay (ARENA working paper no. 13). Retrieved from http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-publications/workingpapers/working-papers2007/wp07_13.pdf.

Olsen, J. P. (2009). Change and continuity: An institutional approach to institutions of democratic government. *European Political Science Review*, *1*(1), 3-32.

Orloff, A. S. (2009). Gendering the comparative analysis of welfare states: An unfinished agenda. *Sociological Theory*, *27*(3), 317-343.

Ostner, I. (2010). Farewell to the family as we know it: Family policy change in Germany. *German Policy Studies*, *6*(1), 211-244.

Pampel, F. C. (2000). *Logistic regression*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE.

Pascall, G., & Lewis, J. (2004). Emerging gender regimes and policies for gender equality in a wider Europe. *Journal of Social Policy*, *33*(3), 373-394.

Pearlin, L. I., Schieman, S., Fazio, E. M., & Meersman S. C. (2005). Stress, health, and the life course: Some conceptual perspectives. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 46*(2), 205-219.

Pestoff, V. A. (1992). Third sector and co-operative services – An alternative to privatization. *Journal of Consumer Policy*, *15*(1), 21-45.

Peters, B. G. (2012). *Institutional theory in political science: The new institutionalism*. New York: Continuum.

Peters, B. G., Pierre, J., & King, D. S. (2005). The politics of path dependency: Political conflict in historical institutionalism. *The Journal of Politics*, *67*(4), 1275-1300.

Pfau-Effinger, B. (2005). Culture and welfare state policies: Reflections on a complex interrelation. *Journal of Social Policy*, *34*(1), 3-20.

Pfau-Effinger, B. (2011). Family childcare in the cultural and institutional context of European societies. In B. Pfau-Effinger & T. Rostgaard (Eds.), *Care between work and welfare in European societies* (pp. 35-51). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Pfau-Effinger, B. (2012). Women's employment in the institutional and cultural context. *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, *32*(9/10), 530-543.

Pfau-Effinger, B., & Rostgaard, T. (Eds.) (2011a). *Care between work and welfare in European societies*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Pfau-Effinger, B., & Rostgaard, T. (2011b). Introduction: Tensions related to care in European welfare states. In B. Pfau-Effinger & T. Rostgaard (Eds.), *Care between work and welfare in European societies* (pp. 1-14). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Pierson, P. (2000). Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics. *The American Political Science Review*, *94*(2), 251-267.

Pierson, P. (2001a). Post-industrial pressures on the mature welfare states. In P. Pierson (Ed.), *The new politics of the welfare state* (pp. 80-104). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pierson, P. (Ed.). (2001b). *The new politics of the welfare state*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pierson, P. (2001c). Coping with permanent austerity: Welfare state restructuring in affluent democracies. In P. Pierson (Ed.), *The new politics of the welfare state* (pp. 410-456). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pollak, R. A. (2002). Gary Becker's contributions to family and household economics. (NBER working paper no. 9232). Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w9232.pdf.

Powell, W. W., & Colyvas, J. A. (2012). Microfoundations of institutional theory. In B. G. Peters & J. Pierre (Eds.), *Intitutionalism II, Volume 2: New research agendas* (pp. 333-362). London: SAGE.

Price, D., & Ginn, J. (2006). The future of inequalities in retirement income. In J. A. Vincent, C. Phillipson & M. Downs (Eds.), *The futures of old age* (pp. 76-84). London: SAGE.

Rabe-Hesketh, S., & Skrondal, A. (2008). *Multilevel and longitudinal modeling using Stata: Second Edition*. College Station: Stata Press.

Radl, J. (2014). *Retirement timing and social stratification: A comparative study of labor market exit and age norms in Western Europe*. London: Versita.

Raymo, J. M., Warren, J. R., Sweeney, M. M., Hauser, R. M., & Ho, J.-H. (2010). Later-life employment preferences and outcomes: The role of midlife work experiences. *Research on Aging*, *32*(4), 419-466.

Roland, G. (2004). Understanding institutional change: Fast-moving and slow-moving institutions. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, *38*(4), 109-131.

Ruitenberg, J. (2016). Resilience of the childhood origins of Dutch mothers' gender role attitudes. *Journal of Adult Development*, *23*, 11-26.

Saxonberg, S. (2013). From defamilization to degenderization: Toward a new welfare typology. *Social Policy and Administration*, 47(1), 26-49.

Scherger, S. (2009). Social change and the timing of family transitions in West Germany: Evidence from cohort comparisons. *Time & Society*, *18*(1), 106-129.

Schmidt, V. A. (2010). Taking ideas and discourse seriously: Explaining change through discursive institutionalism as the fourth 'new institutionalism'. *European Political Science Review*, *2*(1), 1-25.

Schober, P., & Scott, J. (2012). Maternal employment and gender role attitudes: Dissonance among British men and women in the transition to parenthood. *Work, Employment and Society*, *26*(3), 514-530.

Scott, W. R. (2008). Approaching adulthood: The maturing of institutional theory. *Theory and Society*, *37*(5), 427-442.

Searing, D. D. (1991). Roles, rules, and rationality in the new institutionalism. *The American Political Science Review*, *85*(4), 1239-1260.

Searle, J. R. (2005). What is an institution? *Journal of Institutional Economics*, *1*(1), 1-22.

Selznick, P. (1996). Institutionalism "old" and "new." *Administrative Science Quarterly*, *41*(2), 270-277.

Stähli, M. E., Le Goff, J.-M., Levy, R., & Widmer, E. (2009). Wishes or constraints? Mothers' labour force participation and its motivation in Switzerland. *European Sociological Review*, *25*(3), 333-348.

Steiber, N., & Haas, B. (2009). Ideals or compromises? The attitude– behaviour relationship in mothers' employment. *Socio-Economic Review*, *7*(4), 639-668.

Steiber, N., & Haas, B. (2012). Advances in explaining women's employment patterns. *Socio-Economic Review*, *10*(2), 343-367.

Swank, D. (2001). Political institutions and welfare state restructuring: The impact of institutions on social policy change in developed democracies. In P. Pierson (Ed.), *The new politics of the welfare state* (pp. 197-237). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Szelewa, D., & Polakowski, M. P. (2008). Who cares? Changing patterns of childcare in Central and Eastern Europe. *Journal of European Social Policy*, *18*(2), 115-131.

Taylor-Gooby, P. (2004). New risks and social change. In P. Taylor-Gooby (Ed.), *New risks, new welfare: The transformation of the European welfare state* (pp. 1-28). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Thelen, K. (1999). Historical institutionalism in comparative politics. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *2*, 369-404.

Tomlinson, J. (2006). Women's work-life balance trajectories in the UK: Reformulating choice and constraint in transitions through part-time work across the life-course. *British Journal of Guidance & Counselling*, *34*(3), 365-382.

Vincent, S. (2016). Bourdieu and the gendered social structure of working time: A study of self-employed human resources professionals. *Human Relations*, *69*(5), 1163-1184.

Williams, R. (2009). Using heterogeneous choice models to compare logit and probit coefficients across groups. *Sociological Methods & Research*, *37*(4), 531-559.

Wood, S. (2001). Labour market regimes under threat? Sources of continuity in Germany, Britain, and Sweden. In P. Pierson (Ed.), *The new politics of the welfare state* (pp. 368-409). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Worts, D., Sacker, A., McMunn, A., & McDonough, P. (2013). Individualization, opportunity and jeopardy in American women's work and family lives: A multi-state sequence analysis. *Advances in Life Course Research*, *18*(4), 296-318.

Zafirovski, M. (2004). Paradigms for analysis of social institutions: A case for sociological institutionalism. *International Review of Sociology*, *14*(3), 363-397.

Zechner, M., & Valokivi, H. (2012). Negotiating care in the context of Finnish and Italian elder care policies. *European Journal of Ageing*, *9*(2), 131-140.

Zucker, L. G. (1977). The role of institutionalization in cultural persistence. *American Sociological Review*, *42*(5), 726-743.

ISSN (online): 2246-1256
ISBN (online): 978-87-7112-802-4

AALBORG UNIVERSITY PRESS